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ABSTRACT
A stochastic optimization model was developed to determine optimal testing strategies,
costs, and risks of a dual marketing system.  The model chooses the testing strategy (application,
intensity, and tolerance) that maximizes utility (minimizes disutility) of additional system costs
due to testing and quality loss and allows simulation of the risk premium required to induce grain
handlers to undertake a dual marketing system versus a Non-GM system.  Cost elements
including those related to testing, quality loss, and a risk premium were estimated for a model
representing a grain export chain.  Uncertainties were incorporated and include test accuracy,
risk of adventitious commingling throughout, and variety declaration.  Sensitivities were
performed for effects of variety risks, penalty differentials, re-elevation discounts, import
tolerances, variety declaration, risk aversion, GM adoption, and domestic end-user. 
Key Words:  Segregation, Testing, Tolerance, Genetically Modified, Wheat, Risk Premiumvi
HIGHLIGHTS
Biotech grains and oilseeds have become increasingly important in recent years because
of their potential to provide agronomic benefits to producers and specific quality-based attributes
to end-users.  Development of testing, tolerance, shipping, and segregation strategies are
imperative to commercial firms throughout the production and marketing supply chain to
facilitate marketing in a dual system.  Segregation strategies will be important to avoid
adventitious commingling of grain and to ensure effective incentive schemes.  Commercial and
regulatory tolerance limits vary substantially across buyers, indicative that conformance will
reside with tolerance policies.
The objective of this research was to evaluate the optimal testing strategy encompassing
test application, intensity, and tolerance for a dual marketing system consisting of Non-GM and
GM flows.  A stochastic optimization model was constructed utilizing an objective function that
maximizes portfolio utility (minimizes portfolio disutility) of additional system costs for a grain
marketing channel handling two states of nature (Non-GM and GM).  The model determined the
optimal testing application, intensity, and tolerance to employ at country elevator receiving,
country elevator loading, export elevator receiving, and export elevator loading subject to a
specified tolerance at the end-user.  Tests can be applied at any point in the marketing channel
with varying discrete intensities and tolerances (.04% to 5%).
 
Summary of Results
The optimal testing strategy simultaneously determined test application, intensity, and
tolerance that minimized the disutility of additional system costs for a portfolio of segregations. 
The model identified system costs through total costs across all bushels and Non-GM bushels. 
Various sensitivities were performed to determine how stochastic, strategic, parametric, and
other variables affected optimal testing strategies, risks, and costs.  Stochastic sensitivities
included risk of adventitious commingling at first delivery, penalty differentials, and re-
elevation/diverted GM discounts.  Strategic sensitivities included import tolerance specifications
and variety declaration.  Parametric sensitivities included risk aversion and GM adoption.  A
final sensitivity evaluated the effect of a domestic versus import system.  
Stochastic Sensitivities
The main benefit to performing sensitivities on stochastic variables was to assess changes
in optimal testing strategies, risks, and costs from random probability distributions.  Sensitivities
of stochastic variables are examined in succeeding sections and variations are compared with
base case results.  
• Adventitious Commingling at First Delivery.  Costs and risks increased as the rate of
adventitious commingling at first delivery deviated from the base case due to the inability
to distinguish GM from Non-GM content.  Increased risk of adventitious commingling at
first delivery increased total costs through increases in testing cost, quality loss, and risk
premium.  Probability of rejection at importer also increased, while the percentage of
Non-GM flows decreased.  Similarly, lower risk of adventitious commingling at first
delivery increased total costs, albeit with decreases in testing and risk premiumvii
components.  The lower risk case exhibited increases in quality loss and, thus, total cost
due to no testing at country elevator receiving.  Correspondingly, the probability of
rejection at the importer increased and importer Non-GM flows decreased.  
• Penalty Differentials (Discounts).  Penalties varied from 0-10 c/bu for the low penalty
case to 100-150 c/bu for the high penalty case at the importer.  Total cost for all bushels
trended upwards as penalties were increased.  The most pronounced effect occurred in
the risk premium, which increased from 0.33 c/bu for the low penalty case to 4.18 c/bu in
the high penalty case, reflecting a higher cost/risk for non-conforming lots.  Testing cost
and quality loss exhibited similar increases.  However, when costs were attributed to
Non-GM bushels, total cost declined for the high penalty case compared to the base case. 
The percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer was 29 for the low penalty case, 48 for
the base case, and 73.2 for the high penalty case.  The probability of rejection at the
importer decreased as penalties increased, providing evidence of the tradeoff between
testing cost and seller risk.  
• Re-elevation and Re-elevation/Diverted GM Discounts.  Re-elevation and re-
elevation/diverted GM discount cases were incorporated to reflect re-elevation costs at
country and export elevator loading and discounts for diverting GM lots at country
elevator loading and export elevator receiving and loading.  For the re-elevation case,
total cost decreased due to increased testing at country elevator receiving.  The re-
elevation/diverted GM discount case tested more intensively than the re-elevation case,
increasing total cost relative to the re-elevation case, but decreasing total cost compared
to the base case.  Both cases decreased the probability of rejection at the importer from
2.83% in the base case to 1.78%, and increased Non-GM flows at the importer to 73.2%. 
Handlers/shippers required progressively larger risk premiums as re-elevation and re-
elevation/diverted GM discounts were added, providing evidence that re-elevation and
marketability of grain are critical factors.  
Strategic Sensitivities
Strategic decisions by importers and commercial firms have implications for optimal
testing strategies, risks, and costs in a system.  The following sections examine sensitivities on
strategic variables, and variations are compared with base case results. 
• Import Tolerance Specifications.  Importers designate tolerances based on government
mandates and their preferences.  Firms may specify tighter tolerances then necessary
based on consumer preferences and value-added market potential for differentiating
products.  Importer tolerances of 0.5%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% were examined relative to
the base case tolerance of 1%.  In general, total costs decreased as tolerances were
loosened with the exception of the 4% tolerance, which slightly increased due to a
different testing strategy.  Testing costs increased for the 0.5% case and then decreased
for tolerances looser than the base case.  Quality loss decreased as tolerances were
loosened with the exception of the 4% tolerance, which slightly increased.  As expected,
the risk premium required for handlers/shippers significantly decreased with a looser
tolerance specification.  This reveals that loosely specified tolerances for GM could be
attained with little additional risk imparted to the handler/shipper.  Ironically, theviii
percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer decreased as tolerance was loosened.  This
was mainly due to large diversions at country elevator loading from variety risk since
testing was not conducted at country elevator receiving for 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% cases. 
The probability of rejection at the importer generally decreased when tolerance was
tightened and increased when tolerance was loosened; however, it decreased from the 2%
case to the 3% case and again from the 4% case to the 5% case.  This is due to similar
testing strategies for 2% and 3% tolerances and 4% and 5% tolerances and the
corresponding decrease in tolerance within each range.
• Variety Declaration.  Contract mechanisms were adopted to elicit information from
farmers regarding the GM content of their grains.  The level of farmer variety declaration
assumed a Risk Triangle distribution representing minimum, most likely, and maximum
values.  Three models were developed including a 40-50-60%, 65-75-85%, and 80-95-
100% case to indicate the probability that farmers will tell the truth.  Higher levels of
variety declaration decreased total costs across all bushels.  Total cost across Non-GM
bushels also decreased except for the moderate case where they slightly increased due to
the percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer.  The total cost spread between the base
case and the high variety declaration case was 6.5 c/bu across Non-GM bushels.  It can
be viewed as the value to implementing contract mechanisms for variety declaration. 
Testing cost and quality loss generally declined for higher levels of variety declaration
indicating that less intensive testing strategies sufficiently reduced adventitious presence
of GM.  The risk premium also slightly declined from 2.42 c/bu in the base case to 2.34
c/bu, 2.26 c/bu, and 2.19 c/bu for the low, moderate, and high variety declaration case,
respectively.  At the importer, Non-GM flows generally increased for higher levels of
variety declaration, and the probability of rejection generally decreased although the
moderate case experienced a slight increase and decrease in probability of rejection and
Non-GM flows, respectively.  
Parametric Sensitivities
Sensitivities on parametric variables assess impacts to optimal testing strategies, risks,
and costs from system changes including risk aversion of handlers/shippers and the rate of GM
adoption.  The successive sections examine these changes and compare variations with the base
case.
• Risk Aversion (0).  The risk parameter 0 was varied from 0.5 in the base case to 0.4 and
0.9 to represent less risk averse and more risk averse handlers/shippers, respectively.  The
optimal testing strategy intensified as risk aversion increased indicating that more risk
averse firms prefer testing to quality loss.  Correspondingly, testing costs progressively
increased and quality loss steadily decreased for higher levels of 0.  The risk premium
required to compensate handlers/shippers decreased from 2.42 c/bu in the base case to
1.63 c/bu for the less risk averse case and increased to 3.28 c/bu for the more risk averse
case.  The probability of rejection at the importer increased for the less risk averse case
and decreased for the more risk averse case.  Total costs across all bushels and Non-GM
bushels declined for higher levels of 0.  Across Non-GM bushels, the less risk averse
case had a total cost of 43.3 c/bu compared to 15.83 c/bu the base case and 9.19 c/bu for
the more risk averse case.  The large disparities resulted from quality loss and wereix
further exacerbated by the percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer, which
significantly increased for higher levels of risk aversion.  
• GM Adoption.  Varying levels of GM adoption could proliferate in the case of GM
wheat depending upon import restrictions, agronomic benefits, and consumer
preferences.  GM adoption rates were varied for no variety declaration and variety
declaration scenarios to identify system implications. 
Three cases including 10%, 25%, and 30% GM adoption were examined with no variety
declaration; however, only 10% and 25% cases provided feasible results.  The 10% case
employed a less intensive testing strategy that resulted in lower testing costs, quality loss,
and total costs across all and Non-GM bushels.  In addition, the percentage of Non-GM
flows increased from 48% in the base case to 57.8%.  The 25% case tested the same as
the base case and resulted in higher testing cost, quality loss, and total cost when
measured across Non-GM bushels, partially due to 39.1% of flows being Non-GM at the
importer.  The risk premium and probability of rejection at the importer both increased
for higher GM adoption rates, indicating that it becomes more challenging to remove
adventitious presence of GM in a no variety declaration.  The 30% case was unable to
achieve segregation of Non-GM and GM flows at a cost less than the underlying value of
the commodity.  This reveals that GM adoption rates greater than 25% necessitate a
system of variety declaration with contract mechanisms.   
The rate of GM adoption with variety declaration was varied to 25%, 50%, 60%, 70%,
and 75% to simulate impacts on the system.  The 75% case was infeasible indicating that
a GM adoption rate greater than 70% would necessitate an alternate system of testing and
segregation and/or identity preservation (IP) to adequately maintain segregation of GM
and Non-GM flows.  As the rate of GM adoption increased, testing was less intensive and
quality loss generally increased with the exception of the 25% case where quality loss
decreased.  Total costs across all and Non-GM bushels generally increased as the GM
adoption rate increased except for the 25% case where total cost declined.  The risk
premium initially decreased for the 25% and 50% cases, and then increased for the 60%
and 70% cases because disutility was lower for 25% and 50%, and higher for 60% and
70% compared to the base case.  The probability of rejection at the importer initially
decreased for the 25% case and then progressively increased for 50%, 60%, and 70%
cases. Conversely, the percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer increased for the
25% case and then progressively decreased for 50%, 60%, and 70% cases.  The rationale
for lower importer rejection, risk premium, and total costs for the 25% case and lower
risk premium for the 50% case may be attributed to discrete choice and utility theory.
Implications
Development and commercialization of GM crops continues to challenge the current
functions and operations of the grain marketing system.  With the anticipated commercialization
of GM wheat, these issues remain increasingly important.  The research defines several
relationships between optimal testing strategies, risks, costs, and different variables impacting
the dual marketing system.  The impacts of stochastic, strategic, parametric, and other variablesx
on the optimal testing strategies, risks, and costs are shown and evaluated.  Implications for
public and private sectors are summarized in the following sections.
There are several implications for the public sector.  First, a system of testing and
segregation can efficiently provide end-users differentiated grain shipments to meet consumer
requirements at a low cost.  While nil tolerances are unattainable, GM content can reasonably be
assured for current import specifications of 0.5% or above.  Second, grain uniformity and quality
deviations existing in the marketplace are minimized due to quality loss applied at the end-user. 
Sellers view deviations from zero percent GM contamination as an implicit cost; thus, more
rigorous testing ensues thereby reducing GM content in Non-GM shipments.  Third, consumer
differentiation amongst value-added products necessitates a system of testing and segregation to
properly allocate Non-GM and GM flows.
Several private sector implications exist. 
• A system of testing and segregation drastically reduces cost when compared to an IP
alternative.  IP entails increased monitoring and documentation through production,
storage, transportation, and handling phases.  
• With rapid advancements in testing technology, costs and risks will progressively
decrease.  
• Risk premiums evolve to compensate grain handlers for added risks of a dual
marketing system versus a Non-GM system.  
• Adventitious presence resulting from variety risks will encourage grain handlers to
adopt a system of contract mechanisms.  
• Additional penalties encourage handlers/shippers to test more intensively to avoid
quality losses.  
• Import tolerance defines testing strategy and accompanying costs and risks.  
• More and less risk averse grain handlers tradeoff known testing costs for indefinite
quality loss.  
• The rate of GM adoption has a significant bearing on the viability of the defined
system of testing and segregation.  GM adoption of greater than 25% necessitates
variety declaration mechanisms.  With variety declaration, GM adoption of greater
than 70% provides cost prohibitive results and thus necessitates an alternate form of
testing and segregation and/or IP.  *Professor, graduate research assistant, and research scientist, respectively, in the Department of
Agribusiness and Applied Economics, North Dakota State University, Fargo.
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INTRODUCTION
Biotech grains and oilseeds have become increasingly important in recent years because
of their potential to provide agronomic benefits to producers and specific quality-based attributes
to end-users.  Concurrent with the adoption of transgenic grains, development of genetically
modified (GM) wheat has evolved and GM varieties may be available by 2005.  
Development of testing, tolerance, shipping, and segregation strategies are imperative to
commercial firms throughout the production and marketing supply chain to facilitate marketing
in a dual system.  Testing procedures involve detection of genetic modification and the
determination of quality and composition in an attempt to assign a component price.  Shipping
procedures will vary depending upon the investment in infrastructure, which currently is oriented
towards high-volume, low-cost homogenous commodity flow.  Segregation strategies will be
important to avoid adventitious commingling of grain and to ensure effective incentive schemes. 
Commercial and regulatory tolerance limits vary substantially across buyers, indicative that
conformance will reside with tolerance policy.  
This report addresses production and marketing supply chain participants, which
ultimately includes the entire supply chain: input suppliers, production, handling, processing,
market distribution, and the consumer.  Alternative scenarios, encompassing testing location,
method, cost, risk, contract liability, and specified tolerance are evaluated to determine optimal
strategies.  Ultimately, this report analyzes economic costs and risks associated with testing,
segregation, and the establishment of an optimal tolerance.
A stochastic simulation model of a system cost function is utilized to jointly determine
optimal testing strategies for commercial and regulatory applications for GM commodities
including GM wheat.  The model is developed to compare costs and risks for a vertically
integrated firm with a dual (GM/Non-GM) marketing system and jointly determines optimal test
application, intensity, and tolerance.  Effects of critical factors including testing costs and
accuracies, quality loss, price differentials in different market segments, supply-chain costs,
and/or spatial considerations are examined to determine their effects on optimal strategies.  
The model and analysis include: 1) evaluation of various supply chain testing points
according to frequency, type, place, and cost; 2) definition of the system and cost function to
allow alternative testing strategies at different stages of the marketing system; and 3) assessment
of quality loss costs resulting from non-conformance. The major contributions of this study to
the evolving literature on marketing GM crops are:  the quantification of risks and costs using a
systems approach to the grain marketing system.  In addition, we incorporate a Taguchi Loss
Function and the probability and distribution of adventitious presence in the analysis.2
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS STUDIES
Supply chain coordination plays an integral role in the production, handling, storage, and
export of GM grain.  Effective supply chain management for GM grain relies on a multitude of
factors including testing and sampling procedures, segregation practices, identity preservation
(IP) techniques, logistical strategies, and conformance to tolerances in order to ultimately satisfy
consumer demand.  An increasing amount of research has been conducted on segregation and IP
in response to the exportability of transgenic grains to importing countries with specified
tolerances.  This section provides a synopsis of these studies.
Process Verification
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration (USDA-GIPSA) proposed a new process verification program designed to meet
the marketplace’s rapidly evolving needs.  The proposal is under review and would offer a
Process Verification Service similar to what is already available in the Agricultural Marketing
Service for livestock.  Process verification provides producers, marketers, suppliers, and
processors alike with third party verification of their quality processes and standards in an effort
to ascertain buyers and sellers of marketing claims, such as type, production practice, and quality
attributes.  It is based on ISO 9000 principles, an internationally recognized set of quality
standards, to ensure international objectivity and to provide a means to conduct a document
review, review audit, conditional audit, and surveillance audit.  GIPSA, recognized
internationally for reliability and integrity, will provide technical knowledge through its grain
expertise and integrity through mandatory auditor certification by the American Society of
Quality (ASQ).  Collectively GIPSA, and more broadly USDA, will provide a “USDA
Certification” label to enhance buyers’ confidence in process verified products, whether
domestic or foreign (USDA-GIPSA, 2002a,b).
Segregation
Segregation is the isolation of like products with particular attributes to avoid
commingling.  Unlike IP, the identity of the grain is lost once it is accumulated with like
products (Sonka, Schroeder, and Cunningham).  Segregation has evolved in response to
international market acceptance of bio-engineered products and the lack thereof.  Coexistence of
transgenic grain and non-transgenic grain has evoked the supply chain to segregate commodities
such as high lysine corn and high oleic soybeans to ensure added value beyond the farm gate
(Sonka, Schroeder, and Cunningham).  As thresholds are revolutionized in the biotech industry,
strict purity limits may be instituted requiring totally distinct handling systems to conform to
regulations (Sonka, Schroeder, and Cunningham).  
Although considerable debate has endured about segregation, the feasibility is
questionable given negligible premiums for non-transgenic grain, adoption rates, storage, testing,
and logistical implications.  Initially, a survey of elevator managers dispersed throughout the
United States, evoked a substantial negative connotation about segregation benefits, costs, and/or
risks, but a recent survey conducted by the American Corn Growers Association rebuked earlier
connotations.  The survey of 1,149 elevators in 11 Midwestern states conveyed that more than
half of grain elevators preferred segregation of GMO and Non-GMO grains this year, and in3
addition one-fifth offered premiums for Non-GMO corn and/or soybeans.  The rationale for this
rebuttal can be attributed in part to the Starlink corn incident, which solicited widespread fears
associated with allergic reactions, and the reduction in export sales due to consumer confidence
issues (Konsor).  Ultimately, segregation will depend on premium incentives, added costs, and
the evolvement of the international market outlook on transgenic grain.  
Additional system components need to be implemented to facilitate the full adoption of
biotech grain (Sonka, Schroeder, and Cunningham).  A key system component includes
development of transportation and handling infrastructure albeit with huge investment, which
exasperates long-term industry payoff perceptions.  Compounding the issue is that transportation
and handling infrastructure has been historically characterized as highly competitive with very
narrow margins.  Currently, production and marketing for major commodity crops is oriented
towards providing maximum value through low-cost delivery of massive amounts of
homogenous grains and oilseeds; consequently, evolvement of a dedicated channel has lagged
that of its counterpart (Sonka, Schroeder, and Cunningham).  In the future, output trait
enhancement oriented towards value-chain participants may inundate the industry forcing
logistically distinct channels of transportation in addition to segregation to fully realize value. 
Complementary to infrastructure evolvement will be concurrent developments in measurement
technology and dynamic underlying investment analysis (Sonka, Schroeder, and Cunningham).
Identity Preservation
Numerous studies address identity preservation (IP) costs within the supply chain and the
factors that comprise them.  Buckwell, Brookes, and Bradley define IP as a system of
management and trade that allows the source and nature of materials to be identified as they
move through the supply chain.  Wilcke refers to IP as separate storage, handling, and
documentation of separation; and Lin, Chambers, and Harwood define it as a production-
handling-distribution system by which crops are required to be kept separate to avoid
commingling during planting, harvesting, loading and unloading, storage, transportation, and
manufacturing in order to preserve the crops’ identity in terms of the end-use quality genetic
makeup or a unique production process.  Sonka, Schroeder, and Cunningham define IP as a
coordinated transportation and identification system to transfer product and information that
makes the product more valuable; and Dye refers to it as a traceable chain of custody that begins
with the farmer’s choice of seed and continues through the shipping and handling system. 
Irrespective of the definition of IP, it remains a formidable exercise unless the premiums
extracted from the marketplace exceed the costs incurred.  Inherent to IP are the additional costs
in a variety of dimensions including production, storage, handling, and logistics
(Kalaitzandonakes, Maltsbarger, and Barnes).
Identity Preservation Cost
Identity preservation results in two general categories of additional costs: direct and
indirect (hidden) costs (Kalaitzandonakes, Maltsbarger, and Barnes).  The increased need for
market coordination between buyers and sellers, changes in operations due to newly adopted
product identity practices, and increased risks and liabilities stemming from threshold
conformance at destination comprise direct costs.  Overwhelmingly, threshold limits govern the
rigorous nature of an IP system; thus, they comprise the largest portion of direct costs.  Indirect4
or hidden costs result from the underutilization of production, storage, and transportation assets
(Maltsbarger, and Kalaitzandonakes).  Transportation assets and storage facilities are discrete
units, exacerbating IP costs due to their discontinuous or less fungible product stream nature.
Maltbarger and Kalaitzandonakes examined empirical data from three case study
elevators (representing a small, medium, and large) functioning within the Midwest.  Five
efficient high oil corn IP scenarios ranging in volume from 100,000 to 500,000 bushels delivered
during harvest and via buyer call while adhering to a 5% threshold are used to estimate costs. 
Post-harvest IP costs and their variability relative to selected shifters both exogenous and
endogenous to the firm were derived.  Total IP costs averaged 35 c/bu and ranged from 19.85
c/bu to 52.11 c/bu for the first case representing a medium elevator with 500,000 bu of high oil
corn during peak harvest and a large elevator with 200,000 bu of high oil corn via buyer call,
respectively.  Total costs for the direct farmer network ranged from 9.98 c/bu to 27.99 c/bu for
500,000 bu of high oil corn during peak harvest and 100,000 bu of high oil corn via buyer call,
respectively.  The results highlight that even for a loose threshold, IP costs can be significant;
particularly hidden costs (efficiency losses) which comprise, on average, 55% of IP cost and
range from 29% to 75%.   
The results indicate that IP costs are highly subject to volume and the physical
configuration of assets, which suggests that scale economies are not present within the modeled
supply chain.  In addition, delivery options impact cost; for example, the buyer call reduces
indirect cost as it pertains to underutilized elevator storage, but has a corresponding increase in
coordination cost and storage premium.  Furthermore, transportation mode choice and direct or
intermediate supply chain utilization affect IP costs resulting in a direct relationship between
cost and miles for direct delivery and an increase in efficiency when transporting via rail (truck)
for long (short) distances in the intermediate delivery.  
Lin examines the economics of segregating U.S. non-biotech corn and soybeans for
shipments to Japan, the primary non-biotech export market for U.S. grains and oilseeds.
Estimations of price premiums that buyers in the U.S. domestic and Japanese export markets are
willing to pay for the 2000 and 2001 crops are explored.  Additionally, implications are drawn
from non-biotech premiums paid by both U.S. domestic and Japanese export markets in relation
to the cost of segregation.  Finally, an analysis of who bears the cost is examined.
Non-biotech, IP corn constitutes 1-2% of U.S. corn production while non-biotech, IP
soybeans account for 2% of domestic soybean production.  The majority of non-biotech corn and
soybeans, approximately 90%, is exported to Japan through IP techniques. Underlying Japan’s
interest in non-biotech products is changing sentiment among consumers and government
imposed labeling restrictions on 26 food items.  Domestically, non-biotech corn and soybeans
have been used in food processing firms such as Gerber, Heinz, Bestfoods Inc., and Frito-Lay
Inc. 
Japanese buyers’ specification of a 95% purity requirement for non-biotech corn can
effectively be met by patterning corn segregation after high oil corn (HOC) handling procedures
although other methods exist such as the Association of Official Seed Certifying Agencies’
(AOSCA) 99% purity level plan, which allows no more than 1% biotech.  In addition, Cargill
segregates non-biotech corn under Innovasure; a process-based identity preserved system albeit5
without a specified tolerance.  In contrast, the identity preserved system for soybeans has
followed the more rigid, Synchrony-treated soybean (STS) requirements.  STS soybeans are a
non-biotech, herbicide-tolerant variety developed by DuPont and marketed by ADM, Protein
Technologies, and various grain companies.  A purity level of 98% to 99.9% characterizes the
STS IP program; however, in 2001 STS lost its appeal because of its biotech content rigidity. 
Currently, a non-STS identity preserved system patterned after HOC is being adopted for
soybeans to meet threshold requirements. 
The segregation costs presented are extracted from a University of Illinois study, which
estimated segregation costs for 84 U.S. handlers of specialty grains and oilseeds.  In the study
additional segregation and handling costs for handling HOC and STS were 6 c/bu and 18 c/bu,
respectively (Bender et al.).   Lin, Chambers, and Harwood. examine the various costs unique to
segregation including additional costs of storage, handling, risk management (i.e., conformance
risk), analysis and testing, and marketing, along three points in the marketing chain including
country elevator, sub-terminal, and export elevator.  Segregation cost for non-biotech corn from
the country elevator to export elevator was estimated at 22 c/bu if the segregation follows the
HOC system (Lin, Chambers, and Harwood).  In comparison, other researchers in the grain
handling industry have estimated segregation costs at 20 c/bu (Miranowski et al.; Lence, and
Hayes; Moss, Schmitz, and Schmitz; and Krejci).  Non-biotech soybeans patterned after HOC
and STS resulted in additional costs of 18 and 54 c/bu, respectively.  The segregation costs
reported reflect the cost associated with the needed adjustments or modifications to
accommodate non-biotech commodities and include both real and hidden costs, estimated at two-
thirds and one-third, respectively (Lin, Chambers, and Harwood).
Additional costs that are not inclusive of previous estimations are added freight expense,
and producer premiums and incentives.  Freight expense surcharges are assessed to volumes less
than 8,000-9,000 tons and are unique to corn (13 c/bu) where complications arise from multiple
biotech events and the existence of varieties that have not been approved by importing countries. 
In contrast, soybeans typically do not incur additional freight expense because herbicide-tolerant
soybeans are the only approved biotech trait (Lin, Chambers, and Harwood). 
According to USDA’s “Value Enhanced Grain Survey” performed by the National
Agricultural Statistics Services’ Illinois Market News, producer premiums and incentives offered
to producers for non-biotech corn ranged from 8 to 10 c/bu for the 2000 crop and approximately
10 c/bu for the 2001 crop.  Non-biotech soybean price premiums were 15 to 20 c/bu for the 2000
crop and 20 to 25 c/bu for the 2001 crop (USDA-NASS).  Total segregation cost for non-biotech
soybeans from the U.S. farm gate to final destination in Japan is approximately 62 c/bu and 40
c/bu for the 2000 and 2001 crops, respectively; whereas total non-biotech corn segregation costs
are approximately 45 c/bu for both cropping years.  These estimates are reflective of all factors
pertaining therein to segregation cost including producer premiums and incentives, handling
costs at country elevator, sub-terminal and export elevator locations, and transportation
considerations (Lin). 
The demand price elasticity for non-biotech commodities ultimately determines who will
bear segregation costs.  Inelastic demand for non-biotech commodities is supported by strong
consumer preferences for non-biotech, a lack of substitutes, and/or the nature of a commodity’s
market demand.  Lin examines the willingness of Japanese buyers to bear the additional cost of6
segregation and shows that Japanese buyer premiums covered 93-111% and 89-111% of the
2000 and 2001 non-biotech corn crop, respectively, and 85-94% and 71-77% of the 2000 and
2001 non-biotech soybean crop, respectively (Lin).  These estimates infer that demand for non-
biotech commodities in Japan is inelastic, although less than perfectly inelastic.  Inferior
substitutes and inelastic demand for food-grade corn and soybeans underscores the inelasticity of
demand for non-biotech products and allows U.S. grain handlers to pass on the majority of
segregation costs to the Japanese market; however, U.S. grain handlers, exporters, and IP
producers bear remaining costs not borne by Japanese buyers.
Seed Purity is the foundation for segregating GM from Non-GM grain and is attained
through quality assurance programs such as the AOSCA and/or third party services.  Although
100% purity is unattainable, it can be approximated at 99.8% to 99.9% for soybeans due to its
self-pollination nature and approximately 99% for corn due to its cross-pollination nature. 
Additional seed purity can be obtained for corn by: 1) increasing isolation distances between
seed-producing or contaminating fields; 2) planting to ensure different silk and pollen release
among fields; 3) increasing the number of all-male border rows in seed-producing corn fields;
and 4) manually roguing fields to remove undesirable variations.
If the farmer chooses to plant both GM and Non-GM varieties, he or she will need to take
appropriate measures to mitigate contamination risk.  Planters need to be sufficiently cleaned
between GM and Non-GM planting runs to prevent inadvertent commingling of seed.  Planter
cleaning for 99% and 99.9% purity is 15 and 40 minutes for an 8-row planter, respectively, and
25 and 55 minutes for a 12-row planter, respectively (Hanna and Greenlees).  Assuming the
value of farm labor is $15 per hour, the total cleaning cost would be less than $15 between GM
and Non-GM production runs.  Coordination of GM and Non-GM runs would further reduce
planter cleanout cost to virtually nil when configured on a per bushel basis.  The growing phase
entails discouraging cross-pollination in transgenic varieties such as corn and, potentially,
available commodities such as wheat; however, soybean contamination risk is nil because of
self-pollination.  Practices tantamount to those of seed purity should be followed including
temporal, spatial, roguing, border, and isolation zone considerations (Bullock, Desquibet, and
Nitsi).  
The harvesting phase presents additional contamination possibilities because of internal
cleanout or flushing costs associated with the combine when alternating between GM and Non-
GM fields.  The first procedure is detailed in a video produced by South Dakota State University,
which shows two people taking approximately four hours to remove literally every kernel of
grain.  Alternatively, the operator can flush the combine via two steps including light cleaning
and harvesting 60 to 70 bu of the Non-GM variety to obtain approximately 99.8% purity
(Greenlees and Shouse).  The cost of the two alternative methods is disparate; the first method
results in a total cost of $120 assuming labor is $15 per hour, while the second method results in
a total cost of $18.85 assuming it takes two laborers fifteen minutes to clean the combine and the
70 bu is discounted at 15 c/bu.  Currently, contracts between farmers and grain handlers
recommend the use of the second method.  For example, Consolidated Grain and Barge
Company (CGB) and Protein Technology International Inc. (PTI) stipulate that, “Combine was
blown or swept clean and visually verified to be free of all other grain and soybeans,” and
Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM) verifies STS variety purity with the farmer statement, “I used7
reasonable care to clean all harvesting equipment to ensure it was free from any contaminants to
the STS grain” (DuPont Specialty Grains, 2000a,b).
Transportation off the farm costs include sweeping the truck clean and implicit
harvesting costs if a truck shortage is realized due to excessive queuing at the country elevator. 
Transportation from the country elevator to a domestic processor or an export elevator is done
primarily via rail, whereby federal grain inspectors issue each car a certificate, called its origin
grade (Bullock, Desquibet, and Nitsi).  River elevators out of the gulf ports handle
approximately 75% of the whole grain U.S. corn and soybean exports (USDA-FAS, 2000a,b;
USDA-FGIS, 2000).  Consequently, additional barge costs are incurred because river elevators
typically move grain from truck to barge; therefore, they incur a barge cleaning cost, which is
mandated by law and is approximately $300.  Conversely, export elevators incur a minimal
segregation cost tantamount to that of a country elevator associated with segregating varieties
and grades among shipping and storage bins (Bullock, Desquibet, and Nitsi).  Grain not exported
in bulk form is transported to domestic processors where GM and Non-GM segregation is
sustained through dedicated facilities or staggered production runs (Archer Daniels Midland
Company).
Testing occurs throughout the supply chain, but typically the first testing point is at the
country elevator to detect presence of GM or Non-GM grain in a declared variety.  Testing
intensity will depend upon the number of events that have to be recognized to validate GM
content.  Currently, soybeans have been granted 11 transformation events for environmental,
feed, and food release in the U.S., but only glyphosate-resistant soybeans are presently available
for commercial planting.  In contrast, corn has been granted 16 transformation events, many of
which are available for commercial planting, exacerbating testing costs (Bullock, Desquibet, and
Nitsi).  GM events can be detected either quantitatively or qualitatively through an array of
testing methodologies including herbicide tolerance bioassay, Immuno assay, which
encompasses Enzyme Linked Immunosorbant Assay (ELISA) and strip test, and Polymerase
Chain Reaction (PCR).  Selection of an appropriate testing method is contingent upon the
number of events to detect, time constraints, sample size, and result specification. 
Bullock, Desquibet, and Nitsi estimate testing costs at the handling stage for export of
Non-GM soybeans and Non-GM corn to Japan by CGB.  The soybeans are delivered to the river
elevator via truck where two strip tests are used per truck.  The soybeans are stored in shipping
bins until loaded onto a barge, a representative sample is obtained, and a quantitative ELISA test
is performed.  Finally, the barge unloads into an ocean vessel at New Orleans where samples are
drawn and ELISA tests are reiterated.  Total testing costs are 2.31 c/bu; however, corn testing
costs increased to 4.87 c/bu due to PCR versus ELISA testing and the requirement to test for
additional events not approved for import in the European Union (EU) or in Japan. 
Production of GM or Non-GM grains to meet importer specifications ultimately begins
with the farmer; consequently, quality incentives and contracts must be offered to offset
additional incurred costs and risks.  Typically, grain handlers stipulate accepted farm production
practices, premiums, and the delivery window with the farmer; for example, CGB, ADM, and
PTI all offer grower contracts via the OSCAR internet-based contracting system developed by
DuPont Specialty Grains, where approximately 800,000 acres of Non-GM STS soybeans and
700,000 acres of Non-GM soybeans are contracted (DuPont Specialty Grains 2000c,d).  Farm8
premiums vary between $0.10 and $0.30 depending upon variety and contract obligations; for
example, ADM offers elevators a $0.25 premium for STS soybeans, whereby a $0.20 premium is
allocated to the farmer (Archer Daniels Midland Company).  Another example is the 22 c/bu
premium received for Non-GM soybean shipments to Japan; 10 c/bu premium is allocated to the
farmer who must account for extra costs related to cleaning, logistics, and technology, and 12
c/bu is available for the elevator to compensate for additional testing and reshuffling costs
(Bullock, Desquibet, and Nitsi).
In the absence of an internationally recognized set of rules, nations will establish and
contour domestic trade regimes to address consumer concerns.  Inevitably, huge disparities arise
among trade nations; thus, an effective Identity Preserved Production and Marketing (IPPM)
system may be needed to track product attributes and facilitate trade (Hobbs, Kerr, and Phillips). 
Currently, there is a wide range of IPPM systems operating in Canada and around the world
varying in their degree of specificity although commonalities exist among IPPM systems.  All
IPPM systems start with certified seed, are handled and transported through special
arrangements (e.g., containers, dedicated trucks), and segregated at the handler or processor for
movement to the wholesaler, processor, or retailer in an attempt to preserve value-added
attributes (Hobbs, Kerr, and Phillips).  The value-added attributes inevitably will be ascertained
through third party verification and certification because of incentives to cheat.  The principal-
agent problem is readily apparent because ex post verification may not be possible or costly;
however, the incentive will hinge on a subjective assessment of detection and penalties relative
to potential gains.  Third party verification will assure credibility and integrity of the IPPM
system and ascertain the buyer and seller of process attributes (Hobbs, Kerr, and Phillips).
A related study by Smyth and Phillips estimates costs, explores reasons, and evaluates
government statutes regarding the establishment of an IPPM.  The additional cost of operating an
IPPM for small niche market products, excluding other endogenous variables that raise cost such
as testing and conformance risk, is estimated at 15-20% above the cost of moving conventional
products through a supply chain.
Handling Risk
A few studies have tried to quantify risks of adventitious commingling in handling. 
Casada, Ingles, and Maghirang explore residual and cross-contamination of grain during
handling to address the imminent evolvement of segregation strategies to properly segment GM
and Non-GM grain to meet stringent threshold requirements.  The USDA, Agricultural Research
Service (ARS) utilizes a GMPRC Engineering Research Unit (55,000 bu grain unit) to determine
IP procedures for commercial grain storage facilities and contamination levels that may be
realized (Casada, Ingles, and Maghirang).  The research elevator has two legs, each with a
capacity of 3,000 bu per hour.  Cross contamination and residual estimates were evaluated under
three scenarios: 1) red wheat followed by white wheat; 2) yellow corn followed by white corn;
and 3) corn followed by wheat; however, only the second scenario has been analyzed thus far. 
The preliminary residual results indicate that contamination in the elevator boot and receiving pit
was 0.21% and 0.04%, respectively inferring a total contamination level of 0.25%; however, this
figure represents potential contamination since much of the grain will not dislodge and
contaminate subsequent grain lots.  9
A curve of contamination percent versus time after second grain commencement was
constructed and normalized based on contrasting grain sample estimates and the bu percentage
of leg elevation per hour, respectively.  Three consecutive replications unequivocally indicate
that only the first 15 to 20 bu of grain were contaminated at a level greater than 1% and only the
first 40 to 50 bu of grain were contaminated at a level greater than 0.5%.  The study reveals that
the conformance to a rigorous tolerance limit at the elevator location is attainable through
pragmatic clean-out procedures, which rely on employee adherence to an established protocol.  
Management practices such as dedicating facilities and designating biotech delivery dates
may enable the elevator to prevent commingling, minimize queues, and maintain a clean
environment for effective crop segregation.  The segregation of biotech commodities raises
logistical concerns with respect to increased transportation costs resulting from the anticipated
migration from unit train shipments towards smaller unit shipments such as single rail cars. 
According to the North American Grain Exporters Association, a 5% biotech threshold presents
modest increases, but more stringent thresholds, which embark on IP and evoke substantial costs
(Shoemaker et al.).   
In addition to these studies, numerous others quantify IP and segregation costs for a
range of commodities utilizing different methodologies including surveys of elevator managers
(Nelson et al.; Jirk; Dahl and Wilson; Wilson and Dahl, 2001), cost accounting methods (Askin;
McPhee and Bourget; Hurburgh et al.; Bullock, Desquibet, and Nitsi; Sparks Company.; Smyth
and Philips) and simulation (Hermann, Boland, and Heishman; Maltsbarger and
Kalaitzandonakes).  I.P. segregation costs range from 1 to 72 c/bu in these studies and are
summarized in Table 1. 
Testing Methods
Testing procedures vary widely and may be conducted during several stages of
production and movement of agricultural product through the supply chain.  Compliance to a
certain threshold level of genetic material is a major concern for supply chain management and
efforts to mitigate risks will undoubtedly evolve to ascertain conformance.  These efforts will
proliferate through the evolvement of testing protocols and procedures.  Factors to consider
when testing include cost, limit of detection, time required to complete the test, and the level of
technical skill and knowledge required to conduct the test (Stave and Durandetta; Sonka,
Schroeder, and Cunningham).  An overview of testing apparatus, required time, and costs
measured at 95% accuracy are summarized in Table 2. 10
Table 1.  Previous Studies on IP and Segregation Costs
    Researcher
Methodology/Scope of
Analysis
Estimated Cost of 
Segregation/IP
Askin, 1988 Econometric model of costs
for primary elevators
Increase of 2 grades handled
increased costs < 0.5 c/bu
Jirik, 1994 Survey of Elevator Mgrs.
and Processors
11 to 15 c/bu
Hurburgh et al., 1994 Cost Accounting Model for
High Oil Soybeans
3.7 c/bu
McPhee and Bourget, 1995 Econometric model of costs
for terminal elevators
Increasing grades handled
increases operating costs 2.6%
Hermann, Boland, and
Heishman, 1999





1.6 to 3.7 c/bu
Nelson et al.,  1999 Survey of Grain Handlers 6 c/bu corn, 18 c/bu soybeans
Bullock, Desquibet, and
Nitsi, 2000
Cost Accounting 30 to 40 c/bu soybeans
Dahl and Wilson, 2002 Survey 25 to 50 c/bu
Wilson and Dahl, 2001 Survey of Elevator Mgrs
for Wheat
15 c/bu
Smyth and Phillips, 2001 Analysis of GM IP system for
Canola in Canada, 1995-96
21-27 c/bu
Gosnell, 2001 Added transportation and
segregation costs for dedicated
GM elevators
15-42 c/bu High throughput
23-28 c/bu Wooden elevators
Sparks Companies 2000   Non-GM Canola 38-45 c/bu
Non-GM Soybeans 63-72 c/bu
Source:  Wilson and Dahl, 2002.11
Table 2.  Testing Method, Cost, Limit of Detection, and Duration








35S, CP4/EPSPS,NPT11 PCR $25/1000 seeds Qualitatively detects 1 out










35S, NOS, CP4/EPSPS, PCR $25/1000 seeds Qualitatively detects 1 out of
1000 seeds, 
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PAT/pat protein ELISA Microtiter
Plate
$195.00 Detection, .2% 2.5 Hours
Cry9C ELISA Microtiter
Plate
$16.00 Detection, .01% 3 Hours
CP4/EPSPS ELISA Lateral Flow $3.50 Detection, .5%  5-10 minutes
Mon 810, Bt11 ELISA Lateral Flow $3.50 Detection, 1% 5-10 Minutes
Cry9C ELISA Lateral Flow $3.50 Detection, .125% 5-10 minutes
Soybean
35S, NOS, RR PCR $25/1000 seeds Qualitatively detects










CP4/EPSPS ELISA Lateral Flow $3.50 Detection, .1%  5-10 minutes
Source:  Mid-West Seed Services, Inc., and EnviroLogix Inc.12
GM Testing
GM testing is performed through detection of novel DNA or novel protein that modifies
the grain or oilseed.  Available tests include herbicide tolerance bioassay, Immuno assay
encompassing the strip test and ELISA, and PCR.  GM testing provides assurances to domestic
end-users and importers as to the presence or absence of GM content and facilitates marketing
between supply chain participants. 
The designation of a testing methodology depends upon the number of transformation
events that have to be detected and the preference for qualitative or quantitative results; for
example, corn has 16 transformation events that have been granted environmental, feed, and
food release in the United States while soybeans have 11, one of which is available
commercially.  This confers that divergent testing methodologies will be employed based on the
number of transformation events, and ultimately those not approved for importation (Bullock,
Desquibet, and Nitsi). 
Protein Tests
Immuno Assay.  The immuno assay test detects proteins created or expressed by the
modified gene by locating the antibodies that attach to each respective protein.  Immuno assay
manifests itself through two types of tests including the strip test and the ELISA test.  
Strip Test.  Strip tests are rapid, accurate, cost-effective, and can be utilized in
qualitatively assigning a “yes-no” response.  It is the cheapest and easiest method of qualitative
testing available and indicates a positive or a negative depending upon the pre-set level of novel
protein.  The process involves a ground sample, insertion into a tube, and a color change for
positive or negative (Stave and Durandetta).  Several companies market strip tests including
EnviroLogix, Strategic Diagnostics, Inc. (SDI), Neogen Corporation, etc. 
To accurately evaluate and assess testing kit performance, USDA-GIPSA (2002c)
provides test kit performance verification via Directive 9181.2 to detect the presence of
biotechnology events in grains and oilseeds and to assign a qualitative measurement.  Concurrent
with approval, manufacturers are successively listed on GIPSA’s website along with the
event/protein analyte, test sensitivity, and test format characteristics intrinsic to each approved
test kit.  Although test kit approval does not establish appropriate criterion for official use, it aids
in facilitating market transactions between supply chain participants who are ascertaining
product information to comply with market demands. The total cost for a strip test depends upon
the desired event detection, but is approximately $3.50 plus labor; for example, the total cost for
detection of glyphosate-resistant soybeans is $6.00, assuming $3.50 for the test kit and 10
minutes labor at $15.00 per hour (Bullock, Desquibet, and Nitsi). 
ELISA (Enzyme Linked Immunosorbant Assay).  The ELISA test is a laboratory test
that quantifies GM content of a sample for a given transformation event.  ELISA testing can be
applied to raw agricultural products or slightly processed products to reveal a quantitative
approximation of novel protein content (Bullock, Desquibet, and Nitsi).  Novel protein
percentage is determined through the examination of various hues with a plate reader that
analyzes specific antibody reactions and indicates the concentration of the proteins that are13
created in conjunction with the genetic event (Strategic Diagnostics, Inc. 2003).  Several
laboratories offer ELISA tests, and both EnviroLogix and Agdia Inc. provide Bt corn testing,
although no ELISA test currently exists for detecting herbicide tolerant varieties in corn.  Both
immuno assay tests can only be utilized to detect one event; consequently, several tests may be
needed to test for exporter restrictions on several events; however, their simplicity and low cost
make them ideal candidates for grain elevator or processing plant utilization (Bullock,
Desquibet, and Nitsi).  
DNA Grain Tests
PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction).  The PCR test is a laboratory test used to detect
modified DNA by selectively multiplying targeted sections of a DNA molecule, identifying the
novel DNA, and magnifying it over 1 million times.  PCR testing can be applied to raw
materials, processed materials, and mixed products; however, its susceptibly to contaminants or
DNA degradation requires testing to be performed under rigorous laboratory conditions with
appropriate controls.  Several organizations have combated these shortcomings by modifying
PCR tests to extend novel DNA detection to processed foods including Cepheid and Qualicon,
Genetic ID, and LawLabs (Shoemaker et al.).  
PCR testing can be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively depending upon the
desired sensitivity.  The quantitative PCR test uses a DNA probe to produce a fluorescent signal,
which allows the progress of the PCR reaction to be monitored to accurately assign a reliable
GM detection rate within 0.1%.  A qualitative test allows even more sensitive results, which can
detect traces of target DNA albeit results are reported as detected or not detected (Bullock,
Desquibet, and Nitsi).  
Synchronous Testing.  Multiple events can be tested for simultaneously through the use
of several primers, small DNA molecules whose sequence corresponds to DNA sequences
present in GM commodities.  Primers corresponding to DNA sequences present in many GMOs
can be used to detect multiple GMOs, but does not state the modification type, whereas a primer
corresponding to a DNA sequence of a given event allows us to recognize an unequivocal
determination or one individual transformation, but requires several primers to recognize all
transformations (Bullock, Desquibet, and Nitsi).  Importer event restrictions require individual
quantification of GM transformations; for example, 12 out of 16 events approved in the United
States are not approved for import in the EU, while 8 out of 16 events are not approved in Japan. 
Consequently, a qualitative test adding $75 per event is needed to ascertain conformance to
importer specifications, which amounts to $600 and $900 for Japan and the EU, respectively
(Central-Hanse Analytical Laboratory, LLC).  Since PCR is not readily adaptable for rapid
onsite testing, it is better suited for laboratory examinations and export certifications where a
large sample size exists (Shoemaker et al.).
Related Studies
Other logistical studies related to quality improvement include Porter and Rayners’
process costing model and loss function, which utilizes an advanced TQM method for costing
quality and quality improvements throughout the entire system and incorporates plant, facility,
and training investment costs.  Feigenbaums’ PAF model (prevention, appraisal, and failure cost)14
is utilized in identifying quality costs, which include prevention costs (costs of actions to
prevent, investigate, or reduce non-conformity), appraisal costs (costs of evaluation quality
accomplishment), and failure costs (non-conformity costs endogenous and exogenous to the
firm). 
Porteus considers setup cost, rework, and investment requirements inherent to increasing
quality and reducing setup costs on economic order quantities.  The study indicates that
increased logistical costs associated with increased quality uncertainty are borne by system
participants.  Variation of product quality (inconsistency) is a major factor in determining
customer perception of poor quality (Ross) and variation in product quality (inconsistency) is a
major factor in the rejection of parts and that the best way to control quality is through
minimizing deviations from a target (increasing conformity) (Roy).  The magnitude of non-
conformance loss is dependent on the manufacturing process, target value, cost or rework, scrap,
and warranty.  
The Taguchi Loss Function measures deviations from ideal values and, thus, total losses
imparted to the system from the time a product is shipped until it reaches the customer.  The
Taguchi Loss Function places more emphasis on customer satisfaction than other loss functions,
which are focused on producers.  Important assumptions of the Taguchi Loss Function including
the following: 1) the quality loss function is a continuous function and measures target value
deviations; 2) quality loss is essentially a product performance characteristic minimized by
devising quality into the product; 3) quality loss is a result of customer dissatisfaction and should
be measured system-wide; and 4) quality loss is a social and financial loss.  The nominal value
estimation of the Taguchi Loss Function can be modeled as follows: L(X) = k(X-T)
2, where L(X)
is the quality loss, k is the adjustment factor, X is the observed parameter, and T is the parameter
target value.  An alternative formulation when higher values are better is L(X) = k/X
2 and for
lower values is L(X) = k * X
2.
Tolerances
Statistical tolerancing is one approach for quantifying a threshold for a specified
tolerance.  High/low specification provides a range about nominal values, which in the case of
transgenic testing will only provide an upper limit.  Statistical tolerance assigns a probability of a
mechanism to be nonzero, which allows component tolerances to be defined as probability
distributions (Evans, 1974, 1975).  Components may include the presence of a transgenic
attribute, which is important for end-users, processors, producers, and input suppliers.  A trial
and error approach is plausible for discerning between GM and Non-GM product.  The trial and
error approach consists of the following: postulate tolerances for testing, perform an analysis to
evaluate postulated tolerances, reiterate results until satisfied, evaluate tradeoffs of varying
tolerance levels (i.e., out of contract), cost/benefit analysis, and finally the assignment of a
probability of meeting a contract specification (Evans, 1974, 1975).  Tolerance can be
disaggregated into a regulatory and a commercial tolerance, which comprise the conformance
guidelines suppliers are subjected to.  15
Commercial
A commercial tolerance is a firm-imposed tolerance designated to meet conformance
standards for an individual firm.  Commercial tolerances evolve contingent on the adoption of a
regulatory tolerance and its specified threshold.  Currently, corn and soybeans comprise the
majority of discussion as to commercial tolerance discrepancy, but in light of the continual
inception of new transgenic varieties, commencement of additional deliberation will be
imperative.  Although not exhaustive, motivation for establishing thresholds can be attributed to
disparity in consumer demands, product differentiation, market share, public perception and/or
consumer awareness.  Inevitably as biotech products are developed and evolve, commercial
tolerances will be adopted concurrently with regulatory mandates in an effort to minimize
biotech acceptance cost.  
THEORETICAL MODEL
Tolerances play a pivotal role in the determination of an optimal testing strategy to
mitigate the risk of non-conformance.  Other studies have identified tolerance allocation
procedures designed to minimize supplier cost and quality loss.  The bulk of the research is
dedicated to manufacturing processes and the concurrent design of dimensional components to
adhere to an overall assembly tolerance.  Tolerance, as defined in this context, refers to grain and
its maximum allowable contrasting factor(s) such as percentage GM.  The definition of tolerance
necessitates identifying the factors that comprise its inherent risk. 
Tolerance Defined
Wu, Elmaraghy, and Elmaraghy define tolerance as the maximum deviation from a
nominal specification within which the component is still acceptable for its intended purpose. 
Irianto refers to tolerance as a given parameter known as a specification limit.  While there are
varying definitions of tolerance, a consensus among scholars identifies a relationship between
tolerance and cost.  Tolerance defines the maximum, minimum, or range of desired target values,
while costs include testing and market loss resulting from non-conformance.  Various
mathematical functions have been proposed in the literature to fit manufacturing cost-tolerance
field data including Sutherland, reciprocal, reciprocal-square, exponential, and Michael-Siddall
functions (Wu, Elmaraghy, and Elmaraghy).
The general relationship exists, that if tolerance is tightened (loosened) it leads to higher
(lower) incurred costs because effort is altered to meet specifications (Irianto; Jeang; Wu, Chen,
and Tang).  Tolerances and the specification of an optimal tolerance will ultimately vary
depending upon “out of contract costs,” also known as the alternative market discount. 
Generally, the higher (lower) the discount for non-conforming grain, the tighter (looser) the
tolerance specification.  This implies that as non-conformance costs escalate, a more rigorous
approach to sampling, testing, and certifying will be adopted.  Concurrently, loss associated with
tolerance specification should be evaluated in conjunction with testing costs to arrive at an
optimal tolerance. 16
 Several authors examine tolerance assignment via experimental design techniques
utilizing the Taguchi Loss Function and the concurrent minimization of total cost incorporating
manufacturing cost and quality loss costs to determine an optimal tolerance.  Other authors
attempt to determine least-cost tolerance assignment via computer-aided controlled tolerancing
systems, orthogonal array assignment, statistical tolerancing methods, simulation, etc.  Pertinent
studies will be presented in following sections and explored in detail to determine optimal
tolerances. 
Tolerance Analysis Models
Wu, Elmaraghy, and Elmaraghy examine numerous dimensional design tolerance
synthesis and analysis models to effectively compare tolerance analysis and tolerance allocation
methods.  Tolerance allocation models are designed to determine what tolerances should be
designated along the supply chain in order to adhere to a specified assembly tolerance (i.e.,
importer tolerance), whereby tolerance analysis models predict assembly tolerances
approximating actuality in an attempt to reduce rejects.  Each has a significant bearing on
optimal tolerance assignment since grain will inevitably be tested throughout many locations
along the supply chain to meet an overall tolerance, while mitigating the potential for a rejected
grain lot.  
The cost-tolerance function aims at optimizing component tolerances, while adhering to
an assembly tolerance to minimize an overall assembly cost function.  Wu, Elmaraghy, and
Elmaraghy examine five functions including Sutherland, reciprocal square, reciprocal,
exponential, and Michael-Siddall.  The criterion for evaluation utilizes the non-linear least
square method that is fit to each function, whereby the value of the error is minimized and
indexed to compare competing functions and indicate goodness of fit and parameter estimations. 
Wu, Elmaraghy, and Elmaraghy discuss several tolerance allocation methods that have
been adopted to minimize total manufacturing costs.  Results indicate that the Lagrange
multiplier and geometric programming cost-tolerance allocation methods achieve the lowest
average cost.  However, the Lagrange multiplier method does not have the capability to handle
the Michael-Siddall function, while the geometric programming method only has the capability
to handle the exponential function.  Despite these limitations, true optimum solutions can be
obtained with simplicity, reliability, and little computational effort.  The remaining cost-
tolerance allocation methods have the capability to handle all above mentioned cost-tolerance
functions, but remain inferior with respect to average cost, computational effort, simplicity,
and/or reliability when compared to the Lagrange multiplier and geometric programming
methods. 
Pertinent studies in this area also include a methodology to solve a tolerance allocation-
process selection problem simultaneously (Nagarwala, Pulat, and Raman) and an orthogonal-
based algorithm for least cost tolerance allocation and optimal process selection (Gadallah and
Elmaraghy).  17
Quality Loss and Tolerances 
Quality loss is associated with deviation from the target or goal value of a dimension. 
Several authors regard quality loss as a customer loss when the product or parts do not conform
to expectations; consequently, customer loss becomes equivalent to a realized quality loss,
manifesting itself through warranty cost, handling cost, customer dissatisfaction, and/or the loss
of goodwill (Irianto).  Hence, the designation of an optimal tolerance must evaluate the cost of
quality loss and testing cost simultaneously to effectively minimize total cost. 
Numerous studies identify loss functions that quantify cost of quality loss; however, the
Taguchi method has proved to be superior due to its simplicity and good results (D’Errico and 
Zaino, Jr.).  Historically, a Lower Allowable Limit (LAL) and an Upper Allowable Limit (UAL)
represented the acceptable limits of a design parameter whereby no societal loss was assumed to
occur (Roy).  The goalpost syndrome refers to where no loss occurs within the LAL and UAL
region, but where a loss is incurred in the form of an expense whenever the parameter deviates
from that range (Ross).  The Taguchi Loss Function is generally represented with the following
notation: 
Ly ky m () ( ) =−
2
Where:  
L(y) is the quality loss function,
k is adjustment factor (constant),
y is single product quality characteristic, and
m is desired target value.  
The aforementioned representation of the loss function assumes that a nominal product quality
characteristic is desired, so that if any positive or negative deviation from the nominal occurs, it
will be accompanied by a quality loss cost (Irianto).  The loss function can also be applied in




Irianto explores the Taguchi Loss Function, a quadratic loss function that approximates
the balance between customers’ loss from performance deviation and producers’ effort for
performance improvement.  In this study, inspection and correction policies are evaluated
utilizing two differing policies that represent synchronous and non-synchronous rectification of
non-conforming products.  The summation of inspection, correction, and hidden quality loss
cost, defined via the Taguchi Loss Function, allows the most economical tolerance to be
attained, while aiding in policy selection. 
In determining optimal tolerance, Irianto assumed customer dissatisfaction when product
quality characteristics deviated from the nominal target value; hence, the loss function is defined
as follows: L(y)=k(y-m)
2 where k is a constant estimated from claim costs (CO) and target value
(ªO) as C0/D
2
0, and other variables are as previously defined.  The second cost component in
determining an optimal tolerance stems from inspection of all products and correction of non-
conforming products.  The total cost can be represented as TCD= LD+CD where LD is the quality18
loss and CD is the total measurable cost; consequently, the optimal tolerance (D
*) minimizes TCD. 
Irianto illustrates optimal tolerancing via a numerical example where inspection is assumed to be
perfect, and the process follows a normal distribution function.  This approach is directly
applicable to GM grain and the concurrent determination of an optimal tolerance since quality
loss is realized in the form of an alternative market cost when the grain lot is non-conforming,
and a measurable testing cost is incurred to meet tolerance specifications.
  
Wu, Chen, and Tang solve the problem of tolerance assignment via a single optimization
process to minimize total cost, which includes manufacturing cost and quality loss of assemblies. 
Conventional tolerance design lacks a quality factor consideration, but Taguchi’s approach
ignores variations in manufacturing cost based on tolerances assigned.  Thus, a very tight
tolerance causes a correspondingly large total cost due to manufacturing, whereas a relaxed
tolerance causes a large total cost due to quality loss.  Hence, Wu, Chen, and Tang propose a
new method whereby quality loss and manufacturing cost are taken into account simultaneously
to define an optimal tolerance for both symmetric and asymmetric loss functions. 
A cost-tolerance curve is determined from the connection between the manufacturing
cost of a component and the accuracy level desired.  Generally, the manufacturing cost increases
as the permissible tolerance decreases and vice versa.  Multiple component assemblies require
aggregated manufacturing costs of individual components and can be represented as
where M is manufacturing cost, Ci is each individual component, and ti is the MC t ii =∑ ()
individual component cost.  The assembly tolerance is a function of resultant dimensions;
therefore, proper tolerance assignments among resultant dimensions assure adherence to the
overall assembly tolerance.  GM commodities may be represented through the use of resultant
dimensions, since movement of GM grain through the supply chain necessitates repeated testing
at different points to assure conformance.  Wu, Chen, and Tangs’ interpretation of quality loss is
tantamount to that of Irianto, where L(y)=K(y-m)
2 and K=A/ª
2 is determined by estimating an
overall loss of A when a product deviates ª from the target value.
The symmetric loss function considers positive and negative deviations from a target
value to have equal bearing on quality loss.  In order to define an optimal tolerance, the effects of
manufacturing cost and quality loss on tolerance assignment must be translated into the same
coordinates via a monetary index or resultant tolerance.  The following integration,
, evaluates average loss L of a batch product, where f is the  Lf y K y m d y K z =− =
−∞
∞
∫ () ( )
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density function, y is the resultant dimension, z is the standard deviation of the products’
dimension, and m is the target value.  It can be rewritten as L=KAr
2 where A is a constant.  Since
production data is only available for individual components, the manufacturing cost of the
assembly is assumed to be equal to the manufacturing cost of the component and the resulting
tolerance to that of the component tolerance.  When quality loss and manufacturing cost are
plotted, a total cost curve can be graphically obtained, which is concave; therefore, the minimum
of the curve is the optimal resultant tolerance t
*. 
Krishnaswami and Mayne employ a procedure for optimizing the allocation of tolerances
while considering manufacturing cost and product quality in a constrained optimization19
framework.  The Taguchi Loss Function is specified as L=A/D
2*(y-m)
2, where A is the cost of
repair when dimensions are nonconforming, m is the dimension target value, D is the dimension
tolerance, and y is a particular dimensional value.  The loss L describes the cost of a non-
conforming dimension when the target value is not realized; however, full loss does not occur
until the assembly tolerance is violated.   If the functional dimension is assumed to follow a
normal distribution with its mean at the target value, quality loss can be rewritten in terms of the
standard deviation of the functional dimension as L=A/D
2*s
2.  Manufacturing costs were
obtained via the exponential cost-tolerance function utilizing actual cost data for varying
tolerance specifications.  Then, an optimal tolerance allocation procedure utilizing non-linear
programming techniques is employed to minimize the total cost.
Similarly, Taguchi examines loss function with smaller-is-better characteristics, where
the target value is zero, and no negative values are assumed. The loss function can be
represented as follows, L=(AO/DO
2)*s
2, where DO is the consumer upper tolerance limit, AO is the
loss imparted to society when the upper tolerance limit is exceeded, and s
2 is the variance.  The
variance for GM lot concentration from zero can be calculated through averaging variance for all
bushels within the delivered lot (Taguchi).
The objective function is to minimize total cost composed of additional system testing
costs (all supply chain points)  + quality loss ((AO/DO
2)*s
2) of non-conformance to a target value
of zero GM lot concentration (Taguchi).  The optimum testing and tolerance strategy can be
derived from the preceding enumeration and ultimately depends on the desired tolerance
specification.  Comparative statistics were conducted on the critical parameter AO, which
represents the loss imparted to society.  Results concluded that for increasing (decreasing) values
of A, the resulting optimal tolerances were tightened (loosened) to avert nonconformance
(Krishnaswami and Mayne).  This study provides evidence that as “out of contract costs”
increase, for example, in the case of GM grain, tolerances will be correspondingly tightened and
vice versa. This presents several implications for testing strategies across the supply chain and or
the testing methodologies that will be utilized.   
EMPIRICAL MODEL
The model of a cost function utilizing Risk Optimizer was developed to minimize
disutility of additional system costs, which are comprised of testing cost, quality loss at each
marketing location, and a risk premium required for grain handlers to undertake a dual marketing
system versus a Non-GM system.  Testing costs are commensurate with respect to application
point, intensity, and applied tolerance.  Quality loss is incurred at change of ownership points
and is calculated based on the deviation from the target value for GM lot concentration, which is
assumed to be zero.  Model assumptions include specified GM/Non-GM adoption, probability
distributions for adventitious commingling, variety declaration, and binomial distributions to
explain the probability of acceptance given varying tolerances and the concentration in the lot. 
Tests can be applied at various grain marketing locations when received and loaded to identify
Non-GM grain flows that exceed GM tolerances.  The lots identified as exceeding tolerances are
diverted to GM flows and subjected to quality loss.  Non-GM and GM flows are tracked
throughout the system to identify the quantity of Non-GM grain delivered and the amount of GM
grain diverted. 20
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A grain flow diagram and a general description of model components are presented in the
first section.  Figure 1 provides an illustration of grain flows in a dual marketing system.  The
following sections examine the mathematical model description, model elements, parameter
specifications, data sources, and simulation procedures. 
Figure 1.  Grain Handling Subject to Adventitious Presence.21
Grain flows are tracked throughout the system as Non-GM clean, Non-GM commingled,
and GM.  Non-GM grain is subjected to adventitious commingling risk from handling and
transportation functions inherent in the system and farmer variety declaration.  Non-GM lots
exceeding tolerances are diverted to the GM flow at the marketing chain point when they are
identified and subjected to quality loss.  The distribution of grain flows at the importer or
domestic end-user determines the allocation of additional system costs for Non-GM grain. 
Model Overview
The model simultaneously determines the optimal testing strategy (application, intensity,
and tolerance) to employ for a dual marketing system encompassing Non-GM and GM grain
flows. Incentives to adopt in a dual marketing system are provided to market chain participants
from a risk premium, which is specified as p = EVNGM – CE, where p is the value of the risk
premium, EVNGM is the expected costs for a dual system, and CE is the certainty equivalent of
the utility of additional costs for a dual marketing system.  The premium p represents the point at
which decision makers would be indifferent between a Non-GM and dual system.  
Testing locations in the grain marketing chain include country elevator receiving and
loading, export elevator receiving and loading, and either importer or domestic end-user
receiving.  Tests can be applied at any of these functions with varying discrete intensities (i.e.,
1:1 to 1:5) and tolerances (i.e., .04% to 5%).  Strip tests are utilized at country and export
elevators to provide low cost, accurate, and timely results while PCR tests are employed at the
importer and domestic end-user to reflect industry practices (EnviroLogix Inc.).  Tests are
required on every lot at the importer and domestic end-user at a predetermined tolerance
concurrent with industry procedures.  
Mathematical Model Description
Utility Specification
The model uses stochastic optimization of a grain marketing chain that utilizes an
objective function to quantify a risk premium.  Expo-Power Utility, a flexible form for absolute
and relative risk aversion, was developed initially by Saha and previously used by Serrao and
Coelho to determine optimal cropland allocation and risk premiums for crop insurance programs. 
 The objective function contains a von-Neumann-Morgenstern type utility function, with
decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion.  The model chooses the
optimal testing strategy (where to test, test intensity, and test tolerance) that maximizes portfolio
utility (which is equivalent to minimizing portfolio disutility) by minimizing additional system
costs for a supply chain handling a portfolio of segregations representing two states of nature
(Non-GM and GM).  The portfolio utility is comprised of the weighted disutility of additional
system costs (testing and quality loss) for handling both states of nature.  The objective function
can be expressed by the following equation:
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Where:
*i  is the proportion of flows devoted to each state of nature (i=1-2),
e   is the base of the natural logarithm,  
8  is a parameter that determines positiveness of the utility function, 
N and 0 are parameters which affect the absolute and relative risk aversion of the utility 
  function,
Ci is the additional system costs associated with each state of nature (i=1,2), as
previously defined,
Xj   is the decision variable vectors of the model,
Kj  is the opportunity set of model, 
i  is states of nature Non-GM=1 and GM=2, and 
j  represents test application T:, and sampling intensity S:, at location : and tolerance i.
Parameters of the utility function are 8, N, and 0.  A value of 8 = 2 corroborates with
Saha and guarantees positiveness of the utility function.  Increasing the risk parameter N while
holding 0 constant results in an essentially linear effect on the absolute risk aversion.  Hence, the
variation of parameter N amplifies the risk aversion coefficient without altering solutions. 
However, the parameter 0 exhibits a non-linear behavior relative to the absolute risk aversion
coefficient when N is held constant.  Since the objective function is more sensitive to 0 versus N,
the parameter N is fixed at 0.01 and 0 is allowed to vary from 0.4 to 0.9.  Thus, 8 and N are fixed
and sensitivities are conducted about 0.
Additional System Cost
The additional system costs of a dual marketing system are composed of testing, risk
premium, and quality loss costs.  Testing costs are summed across grain marketing points
utilizing strip test technology at all intermediate points (i.e., country and export elevator) and
PCR test technology at the importer or domestic end-user.  Testing costs are incurred at grain
marketing locations.  The optimal testing strategy is determined with respect to testing intensity
and tolerance.  Strip tests are utilized at receiving and loading functions of the country and
export elevator locations while PCR tests are used at the domestic end-user and importer
locations (Table 3). 
Additional system costs arising from testing are defined as:
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CNGM  is the additional testing cost accrued to maintain GM separation for Non-GM
shipments,
CGM  is the additional cost for GM bushels,
:  is the location within the system where tests can be applied (country elevator
receiving, country elevator loading, export elevator receiving, export elevator
loading, importer receiving, domestic user receiving),
T:  is a binary choice variable reflecting whether tests are applied at location :,
TC:i  is the cost of individual test for location : and tolerance i,
S:i  is the sampling intensity (number of samples per lot) at location : and tolerance i,
and 
VNGM:  is the volume (number of lots) of Non-GM handled at location :.
Table 3.  GM Testing Tolerances, Costs, and Accuracies
Strip Tests
Tolerance (%) Accuracy(%) Required Seeds Cost per Test ($)
0.04 95 8000 28.0
0.05 95 6000 21.0
0.075 95 4000 14.0
0.10 95 3000 10.5
0.25 95 2000 10.5
0.50 99 1000 3.5
0.75 99 1000 3.5
1.00 99 1000 3.5
2.00 99 400 3.5
3.00 99 400 3.5
4.00 99 125 3.5
5.00 99 125 3.5
PCR Tests
0.01 99 10000 275
0.05 99 10000 275
0.075 99 10000 275
0.10 99 7500 262
0.25 99 5000 250
0.50 99 2500 250
0.75 99 2500 250
1.00 99 2500 250
2.00 99 2500 250
3.00 99 2500 250
4.00 99 2500 250
5.00 99 2500 250
Source:  Strip – Strategic Diagnostics Inc. (2003), PCR – Mid-West Seed Services, Inc.  24
Risk Premium
The risk premium utilizes 8, N, and 0 and portfolio utility to define the additional
revenue required for decision makers to be indifferent between a Non-GM versus a dual
marketing system.  The risk premium compensates the handler/shipper for potential risks
emanating from detection of GM content in a Non-GM flow, which is subject to quality loss. 
The risk premium is derived from the expected value of the system as follows:
π =− EV C NGM GM NGM $
/
Where: 
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B is the risk premium for the dual system, EVNGM is the expected additional cost of a Non-
GM system assumed to be zero,  is the certainty equivalent of additional system costs for a $ C
dual system, and other parameters are as previously defined.
Quality Loss
Quality loss cost is incurred at change of ownership points when grain is delivered.  In
the case of an integrated firm, quality loss only occurs at the final destination point (importer or
domestic end-user).  A Taguchi Loss Function with smaller-is-better characteristics is utilized to
calculate quality loss imparted to society.  The function does not take on negative values and has
a target value of zero (Taguchi).  The loss is comprised of costs incurred by the handler/shipper
and the end-user.  The handler/shipper is exposed to rejection cost, loss of future business, etc.,
at the end-user while the end-user is exposed to grain quality risks (Ross).  Thus, the
handler/shipper utilizes testing to reduce quality loss, and the end-user specifies a tolerance to
assess quality deviations.  Quality deviations from the target value of zero represent an implicit
cost to the system; thus, shipments containing minimal GM content incur quality losses. 
Shipments containing lower (higher) lot concentrations incur smaller (larger) quality loss 
(Figure 2). 








L  is the Taguchi Loss Function with smaller-is-better characteristics,
is the imposed buyer upper tolerance limit, ∆ o
AO  is the loss imparted to society when the upper tolerance limit is exceeded,
F
2  is the average lot variance for the distribution of GM lot concentration at change of
ownership points from a target value of zero.25




























Figure 2.  Effect of GM Lot Concentration on Quality Loss
The summation of these components of additional system costs is represented as follows:
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Where CNGM is the additional testing and quality loss cost added to Non-GM shipments to
maintain GM separation, and other parameters are as previously defined.  
Total Cost
The risk premium, testing cost, and quality loss constitute the total additional cost
required to operate a dual marketing system over a Non-GM system.  Total economic costs
include a direct cost and an indirect cost component.  The direct component accounts for testing
costs along the supply chain, and the risk premium required to induce the handler/shipper to
handle both GM and Non-GM.  The indirect component accounts for quality loss incurred at any
deviation above the target value of zero.  The aggregation of both components equates a total
economic cost that the organization can expect to incur through cash outlay, customer
dissatisfaction, loss of future business, goodwill, etc. (Ross).  26
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Detailed Description of Model
This section provides a more detailed description of the model.  The flow of grain and
how additional system costs are calculated is included in the following sections.
Country Elevator
Total production is partitioned into a Non-GM and GM grain stream.  Adventitious
Presence (AP) occurs at the farm level due to inadequate sanitation for production and handling
equipment, cross-pollination, and logistical risks.  Non-GM and GM lots are originated at the
country elevator with and without farmer variety declaration.  A binomial distribution is utilized
to confer operating characteristic (OC) curves that identify the probability of accepting a Non-
GM lot given its underlying lot concentration and a specified tolerance.  Sampling parameters
within the Non-GM stream are population size, sample size, and defective units.  The two former
parameters are based on lot specification and sampling intensity, respectively, while the latter is
calculated from the binomial distribution. 
The model chooses whether to apply a test at each grain marketing point and its
accompanying intensity and tolerance.  If a test is applied, samples are drawn, identified, and
diverted accordingly.  Non-GM and GM flows are segregated at the commencement of testing. 
Identified GM flows are diverted to the GM grain stream.  Non-GM flows are divided into Non-
GM clean and Non-GM AP by accounting for sampled and rejected, un-sampled and rejected,
and misidentified lots.  Sampled and rejected lots are lots that have been sampled and identified
as GM.  Un-sampled and rejected lots are lots that have not been sampled, but are equally
represented by a sampled lot when testing intensities are less than 1:1.  Misidentified lots are
sampled and rejected lots that contain a Type I error due to test accuracy less than 100%
(Mendenhall and Sincich).  The proportion of GM and Non-GM grain is recorded as country
elevator stored percentage. 
An estimate of adventitious commingling potential for a dual system is taken from the
recent Starlink corn incident.  Aventis submitted adventitious commingling rates for 33 off-farm
elevators in seven states that indicated StarLink corn was present at concentrations ranging from
0.25% to 62.5% with an average of 3.5%.  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concurred
that the degree of mixing will vary from lot to lot depending upon delivered StarLink
percentages, size of storage facilities, and the number of elevations.  Jenkyn corroborates these
findings through the investigation of flow patterns within storage facilities indicating grain
cohesiveness, internal friction, and outlet eccentricity affects adventitious commingling rates. 
EPA estimated an upper bound for StarLink adventitious commingling potential at 1.2% and
1.5% for 1999 and 2000, respectively.  This represents a adventitious commingling rate three to
four times the overall percentage acreage planted to StarLink of .32% and .43% in 1999 and
2000, respectively (EPA).  Hence, a conservative adventitious commingling rate applied to grain
received at the country elevator is three times the percentage of unidentified GM lots plus
adventitious commingling risk for handling (see Table 4).27
Table 4.  Base Case Adventitious Commingling Distributions 
Location Distribution Minimum Most Likely Maximum
Grower Risk Triangular 0.01 0.025 0.05
Country Elevator Triangular
Receiving 0.001+3*GM 0.01+3*GM 0.02+3*GM
Loading .001 .01 .025
Export Elevator Triangular
Receiving 0.001 0.01 0.025
Loading 0.001 0.01 0.025
Source:  Hurburgh (Grower Risk), Casada, Ingles, and Maghirang (Shipping/Handling Risk),
Environmental Protection Agency (Unidentified GM at First Delivery) Note: GM = % GM
unidentified.
Export Elevator
Grain shipped to export is subjected to adventitious commingling risk from shipping and
country elevator export accountability.  The binomial distribution is similarly applied, sampling
and testing is performed, and flows are diverted and apportioned accordingly.  The proportion of
GM and Non-GM grain is recorded as export elevator received percentage.
  Grain loaded at export is exposed to adventitious commingling risk from elevating grain
to appropriate shipping bins.  The binomial distribution is applied, sampling and testing is
conducted, and flows are diverted and apportioned accordingly.  The proportion of GM and Non-
GM grain is recorded as export elevator loaded percentage.
Importer Receiving
Non-GM shipments arriving from export elevator origination points are subject to
adventitious commingling risk from export shipping and export elevator accountability.  Grain
received at the importer represents a change of ownership point; consequently, quality loss is
calculated based on the delivered grain lot.  A tolerance range is specified from 0% to 100%, and
the probability of accepting the lot is calculated using the aforementioned binomial distribution.
The relative percentages from 0% to 100% are multiplied by the amount of Non-GM grain to
obtain the number of observations in each tolerance range.  The average between successive
tolerances is calculated, squared, and multiplied by the change in successive observations to
configure individual tolerance variances.  Subsequently, tolerance variances are summed to
arrive at average lot variance for the distribution of GM lot concentration for the importer.  The
resulting variance, upper tolerance limit, imparted loss, and Non-GM quantity is utilized to
calculate quality loss from exceeding the target value of 0%. 
Sampling and testing identify GM lots exceeding tolerance to be diverted and apportion
Non-GM into Non-GM Clean and Non-GM AP.  Buyer and seller risks are measured directly. 
The seller’s risk is the probability of lot being rejected at the importer when it is in fact Non-28
GM.  Whereas the buyer’s risk is the probability that an unsatisfactory lot (Non-GM AP) is not
rejected at the importer (Winston).  The proportion of GM and Non-GM grain is recorded as
importer percentage and used to calculate costs for Non-GM bushels.
Domestic End-User
Grain shipped to the domestic end-user via the country elevator is subject to domestic
shipping adventitious commingling risk and country elevator accountability.  Additionally,
quality loss and buyer/seller risk are calculated as aforementioned.  The proportion of GM and
Non-GM grain is recorded as domestic percentage and used to calculate costs for Non-GM
bushels.
Detailed Description of Model Elements and Parameter Calculations
The following sections define distributions and parameters used in the model.  Parameter
calculations are described and distributions are specified.  The model incorporates risk in several
random variables.  These include sampling risk at locations where sampling is conducted
(number of samples identified); adventitious commingling risks at several locations (farm,
country elevator, export elevator, and transportation equipment) due to inadequate cleaning, etc.;
variety declaration; binomial; test accuracy and quality loss.  Additional model elements
examined include transportation modes and optimal testing parameters.
Sampling
  Sampling for the detection of biotech grains introduces risk to exporters and importers
alike.  The inherent risk can be classified into three basic categories: (1) sampling, (2) sample
preparation, and (3) analytical method.  Sampling encompasses establishment of a quality level,
protocol selection, sample size, and sampling tools.  Sampling protocols are available to mitigate
risks to buyers and sellers including single, double, and multiple sampling plans that incorporate
AQL (Acceptable Quality Level) and LTPD (Lot Tolerance Percent Defective).  Sellers select a
quality level that they want to have accepted most of the time (e.g., 90% or 95%) called an AQL
whereas buyers select a quality level that they want rejected the majority of the time (e.g., 90%
or 95%) referred to as LTPD.  The probability of rejection of a satisfactory batch whose quality
actually equals the AQL is referred to as seller’s risk whereas the probability of accepting a lot
whose quality is unsatisfactory is referred to as buyer’s risk. 
In order to quantify seller and buyer’s risk, the Risk Hypergeometric distribution utilizes
lot size, sample size, and defectives concurrently.  A more complex method is the double
sampling plan, which entails defective ranges for accept or reject, and an intermediary range
where the decision is indeterminate.  In order to ascertain this indifference, a larger sample size
is analyzed and if the sum of the total defectives is greater than the upper bound, the lot is
rejected, otherwise it is accepted (Winston).  A multiple qualitative sampling plan utilizes a
specified number of independent samples to assign a positive or negative indicator.  The
maximum allotted positive results is determined to accept or reject the lot; hence, the higher the
allotment for positives, the higher the probability of accepting the lot for any given percent
concentration (USDA-GIPSA, 2000). 29
Adventitious Commingling Distributions
Adventitious commingling distributions used in the model utilize previous studies
conducted by the EPA on StarLink corn on variety risk, and Hurburgh and Casada, Ingles, and
Maghirang on handling risk.  A Risk Triangle distribution was utilized to reflect the minimum,
most likely, and maximum value.  The distribution for farm level adventitious commingling was
estimated from studies on grower risks inclusive of volunteers, pollen drift, and on-farm
handling (Hurburgh; Thomas and Leeson; Hucl and Matus-Cadiz).  Country elevator receiving
adventitious commingling rate includes handling (Casada, Ingles, and Maghirang) and variety
risk (EPA).  Country elevator loading adventitious commingling rate includes shipping/handling
risk (Casada, Ingles, and Maghirang).  Export elevator receiving and loading adventitious
commingling rates include handling and shipping/handling risk, respectively.  The distributions
are presented in Table 4.
Variety Declaration Distributions
Variety declaration indicates farmer, country elevator, and export elevator accountability
when declaring grain shipments.  The base case scenario assumes variety declaration at the
farmer level is zero (i.e., no variety declaration).  Variety declaration elsewhere assumes
contractual relations and/or elevator-imposed mechanisms govern farmer deliveries.  Variety
declaration estimates were solicited in a survey of market participants knowledgeable on GM
corn and soybean marketing (Wilson and Dahl, 2002).  Results were used to derive a Risk
Triangle distribution for variety declaration which represents the probability that farmers will
tell the truth (i.e., accountability) when delivering Non-GM or GM grain.  Table 5 summarizes
variety declaration distributions.
Table 5.  Variety Declaration Distributions
Location Distribution Minimum Most Likely Maximum
No Variety Declaration (Base Case)
Farmer NA 0 0 0
Country Elevator Triangular 0.95 0.99 1
Export Elevator Triangular 0.98 0.99 1
Variety Declaration
Farmer Triangular 0.8 0.95 1
Country Elevator Triangular 0.95 0.99 1
Export Elevator Triangular 0.98 0.99 1
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   Figure 3.  Operating Characteristic Curves
Binomial Distribution
A binomial distribution is utilized to determine the probability of accepting various lot
concentrations with specified tolerances.  Tightening (loosening) tolerance decreases (increases)
the probability of accepting a given lot concentration.  The model utilizes the binomial
distribution to simultaneously determine the optimal testing strategy (application, intensity,
tolerance).  It is specified as BINOMDIST (number_s, trials, probability_s, cumulative), where
number_s is the number of successes (lot size * tolerance), trials is the lot size, probability_s is
the underlying lot concentration, and cumulative is TRUE.  Lot size is 1000, tolerance ranges





Fmarketing point.  The model identifies the probability of rejecting a lot at each location
depending upon incoming GM lot concentration in the Non-GM flow and the simulated
tolerance at each location.  The probability of rejecting a lot is defined as, PREJECT = 1-PACCEPT ,
and potential grain rejection equals, NGMAP*PREJECT .  The calculation, NGMAP*PREJECT defines
defective units in the Risk Hypergeometric distribution, which subsequently determines the
amount of grain rejected and diverted within the Non-GM flow.   Figure 3 illustrates computed
Operating Characteristic (OC) curves using the normal approximation to the binomial.  The
probability curves depict the probability of acceptance given GM lot concentration and
tolerance. 31
Test Accuracy
Through the optimal selection of a test tolerance, the model defines the corresponding
test accuracy.  Tolerance and its corresponding test accuracy are presented in Table 6.
Table 6.  Base Case Test Tolerance/Accuracy
Strip Tests


























Source:  Strip – Strategic Diagnostics Inc. (2003), PCR – Mid-West Seed Services, Inc.
Quality Loss Distribution
Quality loss is the loss imparted to society when deviating from the designated target
value of zero.  The penalty, AO for exceeding the upper GM tolerance limit is uniformly
distributed with a range of 40-90 c/bu in the export market and 2-20 c/bu in the domestic market. 
Additional penalties at intermediate points may be incurred due to re-elevation charges or grain
transfers among non-integrated firms.  This penalty range identifies a best/worse case scenario
through two cost components, discounted grain and logistical costs.  Discounts for GM in Non-
GM corn are historically 10% of the value, which is approximately 40 c/bu in the case of wheat. 
In addition, rejection may entail re-shipping grain to an alternative market, which is 50 c/bu in32
many geographic locations internationally.  Ultimately, contract specifications govern the testing
protocols and penalties sustained by the buyer and seller.  Origin versus destination testing and
external shipping bins provide flexibility to the shipper for re-routing of GM lots and minimizes
out-of contract costs.
Transportation Modes
Transportation modes were designated for grain marketing locations and include truck,
rail, and barge hold for country elevator receiving, country elevator loading/export elevator
receiving, and export elevator loading/importer receiving, respectively.  Sampling is conducted
on the respective mode at each location and determines testing cost based on application and
intensity.  Transportation parameters are presented in Table 7.
Table 7.  Transportation Modes
Location Mode Unit Size (Bushels)
Country Elevator




Loading Barge Hold 33,000
Importer Elevator
Receiving Barge Hold 33,000
Source:  Wilson and Dahl, 2002.
Optimal Testing Parameters
The optimal testing strategy simultaneously chooses test application, intensity, and
tolerance for intermediate points (country elevator, export elevator) subject to defined importer
and domestic end-user tolerances.  Tests may be applied at country elevator receiving, country
elevator loading, export elevator receiving, and export elevator loading; however, they are
required at the importer (base case) and domestic end-user.  Test intensity is 1:1 (test every lot)
at the importer and domestic end-user, but may vary from 1:1 to 1:5 (test every fifth lot) at
intermediate points.  Test tolerance for PCR and strip testing can be applied from .04% to 5% at
intermediate points (See Table 6), but is predefined at the importer and domestic end-user from
0.5% to 5% with a base case of 1%.   
Utility Parameters




Data used in this research was obtained from the sources identified in Table 8.
Table 8.  Data Sources
           Model Component                Data Source
Utility Specification Saha
Risk Premium Serrao and Coelho
Adventitious Commingling Risk, Handling Hurburgh; Casada, Ingles, and Maghirang
Adventitious Commingling Risk, Variety Environmental Protection Agency
Variety Declaration Survey of Market Participants
(Wilson and Dahl, 2002)
Sampling Parameters Winston
Binomial Specification USDA-GIPSA 2000
Test Cost/Accuracy Strategic Diagnostics, Inc. 2003 and 
Mid-West Seed Services, Inc.
Quality Loss Taguchi
Transportation Modes Wilson and Dahl, 2002
Simulation/Optimization Procedures
Risk Optimizer utilizes simulation and genetic algorithm-based optimization techniques
to optimize models containing uncertainty.  Probability distribution functions representing
uncertainty are employed to define risk for model components and are entered into specific
spreadsheet cells in lieu of a formula or number (Palisade).
Weighted disutility is defined as the target cell to be minimized via adjusting test
application, test intensity, and test tolerance cells subject to constraints at the country elevator
receiving/loading, and export elevator receiving/loading locations.  Model constraints are
specified for test application, test intensity, and test tolerance.  Test application specifies whether
a test is applied (Yes=1, No=0); test intensity specifies the frequency the test is applied (1:1, 1:2,
1:3, 1:4, 1:5); and test tolerance specifies the tolerance the test is applied  (.04% to 5%). 
Subsequently, Risk Optimizer runs a full simulation for each potential trial solution generated by
the genetic algorithm-based optimizer.  Each iteration of a trial solution’s simulation samples
probability distribution functions to generate new values for the target cells.  One thousand
iterations are performed successively until distributions are adequately filled and simulated
results are plausible (Palisade).  Mutation rate is set at 0.2, crossover rate is 0.5, and only default
operators are employed.34
RESULTS AND SENSITIVITIES
Base Case Definition and Results
The base case is defined to reflect the most likely system and protocols for a dual
marketing system.  These include the following:
! Export shipment to importers
! GM adoption of 20% by farmers (based on market distributions of GM aversion)
! No variety declaration of GM content at country elevator
! The adventitious commingling risk due to the inability to distinguish GM content
through variety declaration is 3 times the volume of unidentified GM delivered at the
country elevator. 
! Testing application is allowed at any or all of the following: Country Elevator (CE)
receiving/loading, and at Export Elevator (EE) receiving/loading
! Tests applied at CE and EE locations utilize strip test technology
! Tests applied at the importer utilize PCR test technology 
! Testing intensity is allowed to vary from 1 to 5 at the CE and EE
! Testing intensity is every unit at the importer
! Testing tolerance is allowed to vary from .04% to 5% at the CE and EE
! 1% importer tolerance specification
! 8=2, N=0.01, and 0=0.5 
! The penalty for exceeding the upper tolerance limit is 40-90 c/bu
The results (Table 9) identify the optimal testing strategy, accompanying costs, and risks
that maximize utility (minimize disutility) of a dual marketing system versus a Non-GM system. 
The optimal strategy is to test every other truckload at the country elevator when
receiving at a 4% tolerance, test every railcar at the country elevator when loading at a 0.5%
tolerance, and test ship hold at the export elevator when loading at a 0.5% tolerance.  The sellers
risk is the average rejection of Non-GM bushels delivered to the importer of 2.83%.  The buyers
risk is the 0.000154% of lots containing adventitious presence of GM in the importer flow after
testing.  The cumulative distribution of the probability of rejection at the importer is shown in
Figure 4.  The distribution of the probability of rejection identifies discrete levels of rejection at
.015, .0275, and .04.  Correspondingly, there is a 10%, 70%, and 90% probability of being less
than 1.5%, 2.75%, and 4%, respectively. 
The proportion of flows in the Non-GM channel declines from 80% at the farm level to
48% at the importer due to sampling, testing, and diversion of Non-GM lots containing
adventitious presence of GM.  The cumulative distribution of the proportion of flows at the
importer is illustrated in Figure 5.  The distribution of the proportion of flows indicates a 5%
probability of being less than 46.3% and a 95% probability of being less than 49.7%.  35
Table 9.  Base Case Results
 Base  Case
              Utility 1.0145
Optimal Strategy
Test (1=yes, 0=no)-Intensity-Tolerance
Country Elevator Receiving 1-2-4%
Country Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5%
Export Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5%
Probabilities
GM in Importer Flows (Buyer Risk) .000154%
Rejection at Importer (Seller Risk) 2.83%
Costs (c/bu)
Testing/All bu 0.68
Quality Loss/All bu 4.47
Testing/Non-GM bu 1.42
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 9.36
Certainty Equivalent (Premium) 2.42
Total/All bu 7.57
Total/Non-GM bu 15.83
Location Percentage of Non-GM flow
Adoption Rate 80.0%
Farmer in Bin 80.0%
Country Elevator Received 77.7%
Country Elevator Loaded 50.6%
Export Elevator Received 51.6%
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Figure 5.  Base Case: Distribution of the Proportion of Non-GM Flows at the Importer37
 The utility of the base case is 1.0145, equating a certainty equivalent of 2.42 c/bu.  This
represents the premium required by the handler/shipper to be indifferent between the Non-
GM/GM system with its accompanying test strategy (application, intensity, tolerance) and a
Non-GM system.  Alternatively, the premium reflects the perceived value of the additional risk
incurred in a dual marketing system through handling GM and marketing Non-GM..
  
Testing and quality loss at the importer are 5.15 c/bu for all bushels.  Components of cost
include the following: testing every other truck with a 4% tolerance at country elevator
receiving, .219 c/bu; testing every railcar with a 0.5% tolerance at country elevator loading, .082
c/bu; testing every barge hold with a 0.5% tolerance at export elevator loading, .006 c/bu; testing
every barge hold at the importer, .38 c/bu; and quality loss at the importer of 4.47 c/bu.  If
attributed solely to Non-GM bushels, the cost escalates to 10.78 c/bu for testing and quality loss. 
In conjunction with the risk premium, total costs are 7.57 c/bu evaluated for all bushels and
15.83 c/bu evaluated for Non-GM bushels.  These costs are inclusive of testing and quality loss
within a dual marketing system and do not account for additional segregation, monitoring, etc.  
Figure 6 illustrates the cumulative distribution of additional system costs for Non-GM bushels. 
The distribution of additional system costs indicates a 5% probability of total costs being less
than 3.98 c/bu and a 95% probability of being less than 39.35 c/bu.
Sensitivities on Stochastic Variables
Stochastic variables are used to demonstrate risks inherent in the dual marketing system.
The primary uncertainty is adventitious presence of GM within the Non-GM flow and its
potential impact on additional system costs arising from adventitious commingling risks, penalty
differentials, and re-elevation discounts. 
Adventitious Commingling at First Delivery
Adventitious commingling risks includes handling and shipping and those due to the
inability to differentiate GM from Non-GM at the first point of delivery to the marketing system. 
Hurburgh et al. and Casada, Ingles, and Maghirang collectively quantify handling and shipping
risks.  However, without some method of distinguishing GM from Non-GM content, such as
declaration of variety or GM content, whole lots of GM grain may be introduced to Non-GM
segregations.  EPA estimated adventitious commingling occurring with Starlink due to the
inability to distinguish Starlink corn from Non-Starlink at first delivery.  In the base case,
handling, shipping, and variety risks utilized distributions provided in Table 4.  However, the
extent of risk due to the inability to distinguish GM from Non-GM at first delivery depends upon
critical factors such as local percentages of GM and Non-GM grain, size and type of storage
facilities, number of grain elevations, etc.  To this end, the risk of commingling due to the
inability to distinguish GM from Non-GM content was varied to determine impacts upon testing
strategy, risks, and costs.  Two cases are developed where commingling risk at first delivery was
lower (2 * Unidentified GM) and a second with higher risk (3.5 * Unidentified GM).  Results are
presented in Table 10 for these alternative commingling risk cases.  
The lower risk of adventitious commingling at first delivery model tests less intensively
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Figure 6.  Base Case: Distribution of Additional System Costs
unit at export elevator loading at a 0.75% tolerance.  The higher risk of adventitious
commingling at first delivery model tests at the same intensity as the base case; however, testing
tolerances are tighter at country elevator receiving and export elevator loading and looser at
country elevator loading with an overall lower testing cost.  
The probability of rejection at the importer is the highest for the model with lower risk of
adventitious commingling at first delivery, 3.08% versus 2.83% in the base case and 3.03% for
the model with higher risk of adventitious commingling.  The degree of seller risk varies
according to testing strategy; namely, the less intensive (lower cost) strategy results in higher
rejection risk at the importer when importer specifications are unchanged.  GM in importer flows
is negligible. 
Quality loss increased while testing costs declined for Non-GM bushels in both models
with lower and higher risk of adventitious commingling at first delivery.  Disutility increased as
the rate of adventitious commingling at first delivery increased resulting in an increase in the risk
premium required for decision makers to be indifferent between a Non-GM/GM or a Non-GM
system.  In addition, the percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer declined 8.75% and 6.04%
from the base case for lower and higher risk of adventitious commingling at first delivery,
respectively.  The combinatorial nature of the abovementioned factors and discrete choice and
utility theory results in higher Non-GM costs for lower and higher risk of adventitious
commingling at first delivery as illustrated in Figure 7.39
Table 10.  Base Case Results and Sensitivity to Risk of Adventitious Commingling Due to
Inability to Distinguish GM Content at First Delivery
Adventitious Commingling Risk at First
Delivery (Multiple of GM Content
Delivered and Accepted for Non-GM
Segregations)
2* Base Case 3* 3.5*
Utility 1.0144 1.0145 1.0147
Optimal Strategy
Test (1=yes, 0=no)-Intensity-Tolerance
Country Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 1-2-4% 1-2-3%
Country Elevator Loading 1-1-5% 1-1-0.5% 1-1-5%
Export Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Loading 1-1-0.75% 1-1-0.5% 1-1-0.75%
Probabilities
GM in Importer Flows (Buyer Risk) .000293% .000154% .000152%
Rejection at Importer (Seller Risk) 3.08% 2.83% 3.03%
Costs (c/bu)
Testing/All bu 0.46 0.68 0.66
Quality Loss/All bu 5.24 4.47 4.93
Testing/Non-GM bu 1.04 1.42 1.47
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 12.01 9.36 10.98
Certainty Equivalent (Premium) 2.42 2.42 2.46
Total/All bu 8.12 7.57 8.06
Total/Non-GM bu 18.61 15.83 17.92
Location Percentage of Non-GM Flow
Adoption Rate 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Farmer in Bin 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Country Elevator Received 100.0% 77.7% 77.7%
Country Elevator Loaded 46.6% 50.6% 47.7%
Export Elevator Received 47.6% 51.6% 48.8%
Export Elevator Loaded 44.6% 48.9% 46.0%


















































































Testing Cost Quality Loss Risk Premium Rejection at Importer
Figure 7.  Effects of Variety Risk on Testing Cost, Quality Loss, Risk Premium and
Importer Flow
Penalty Differentials (Discounts) 
The base case assumed a discount (AO = 40-90 c/bu) at the importer when the upper
tolerance limit was exceeded.  However, discounts or penalties are contract terms of individual
buyers and through cumulative interaction of all buyers and sellers results in a competitive
equilibrium.  To illustrate, discounts are varied at the importer to reflect higher and lower values
placed on non-conforming shipments.  Two cases are developed, one with lower discounts (0-10
c/bu) and a second with higher discounts (100-150 c/bu).  The results for discounts applied at the
importer are presented in Table 11.
Lower penalties resulted in a less intensive testing strategy.  Testing is performed on
every unit at country elevator loading at a 5% tolerance and every unit at export elevator loading
at a 0.5% tolerance.  The less intensive testing strategy exposes the seller to additional risk of
rejection at the importer, which increases from 2.83% in the base case to 4.57% with lower
discounts.  In contrast, higher penalties resulted in testing at fewer points compared to the base
case but at greater intensities and tolerances.  Testing is conducted on every unit at country
elevator receiving at a 2% tolerance and every unit at export elevator loading at a 0.75%
tolerance effectively reducing seller risk to 1.78% at the importer (Figure 8).  GM in importer
flows is negligible.41
Table 11.  Sensitivities to Importer Penalty Differentials
             Penalty  0-10 c/bu
Base Case
40-90 c/bu 100-150 c/bu
          Utility 1.0054 1.0145 1.0191
Optimal Strategy
Test (1=yes, 0=no)-Intensity-Tolerance
Country Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 1-2-4% 1-1-2%
Country Elevator Loading 1-1-5% 1-1-0.5% 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5% 1-1-0.5% 1-1-0.75%
Probabilities
GM in Importer Flows (Buyer Risk) .000233% .000154% .0000702%
Rejection at Importer (Seller Risk) 4.57% 2.83% 1.78%
Costs (c/bu)
Testing/All bu 0.34 0.68 1.01
Quality Loss/All bu 0.82 4.47 4.76
Testing/Non-GM bu 1.18 1.42 1.38
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 2.82 9.36 6.53
Certainty Equivalent (Premium) 0.33 2.42 4.18
Total/All bu 1.49 7.57 9.95
Total/Non-GM bu 5.15 15.83 13.65
Location Percentage of Non-GM flow
Adoption Rate 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Farmer in Bin 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Country Elevator Received 100.0% 77.7% 77.7%
Country Elevator Loaded 31.5% 50.6% 77.7%
Export Elevator Received 32.8% 51.6% 78.2%
Export Elevator Loaded 29.7% 48.9% 74.3%
Importer Received 29.0% 48.0% 73.2%
Additional system costs increases for all bushels as higher penalties are imposed.
Concurrent with testing intensity, testing cost increases 100% from the low penalty case to the
base case, and 48.5% from the base case to the high penalty case.  Similarly, quality loss
increases 445% from the low penalty case to the base case and 7% from the base case to the high
penalty case.  Disutility for each of the cases increased as the penalty AO increased and is
reflected in the risk premium required for compensating handlers/shippers participating in a dual
marketing system.  With a penalty differential of 0-10 c/bu, the risk premium is .33 c/bu, but
increases 633% to 2.42 c/bu for the base case, and another 72.7% to 4.18 c/bu for the high
penalty case. 
The percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer increases as higher penalties are
prescribed with 29.04% Non-GM delivered in the low penalty case, 47.98% Non-GM delivered
in the base case, and 73.24% Non-GM delivered in the high penalty case.  Resultantly, additional
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Figure 8.   Effects of Penalty Differentials on Rejection Rates and Costs per Non-GM
Bushel 
Re-elevation and Re-elevation/Diverted GM Discounts
Cases are examined where discounts are applied at intermediate points for re-elevation
and/or lots are identified as GM and diverted.  In the first case, a re-elevation penalty (0-10 c/bu)
is employed at country and export elevator loading to reflect the estimated cost of redirecting
grain destined for shipment back to the facility.  Penalties are not assigned at country elevator
receiving and export elevator receiving because all grain is equally segregated at the point of
origin. 
A second case is developed that incorporates re-elevation discounts plus an assigned
implicit cost for diverted GM grain along the marketing chain.  A penalty of 5 c/bu is allocated
to all GM lots that are diverted at country elevator loading and export elevator receiving and
loading.  Discounts for GM versus Non-GM grain may prevail; thus, the penalty effectively
accounts for potential losses in marketing GM once ownership is taken.  Table 12 presents re-
elevation and re-elevation/GM discount cases with respect to the base case.  
Re-elevation and re-elevation/diverted GM cases tested more intensively at country
elevator receiving versus the base case, but avoided testing when loading at the country elevator.
Testing was conducted on every unit at country elevator receiving at a 4% tolerance for the re-
elevation case and 0.75% tolerance for the re-elevation/diverted case and on every unit at export
elevator receiving at a 0.75% tolerance. 43
Table 12.  Sensitivities to Re-elevation and Re-elevation/GM Discounts






Diverted GM 5 c/bu
         Utility 1.0145 1.0156 1.016
Optimal Strategy
Test (1=yes, 0=no)-Intensity-Tolerance
Country Elevator Receiving 1-2-4% 1-1-4% 1-1-1%
Country Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5% 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5% 1-1-0.75% 1-1-0.75%
Probabilities
GM in Importer Flows (Buyer Risk) .000154% .0000702% .0000702%
Rejection at Importer (Seller Risk) 2.83% 1.78% 1.78%
Costs (c/bu)
Testing/All bu 0.68 1.01 1.21
Quality Loss/All bu 4.47 2.67 2.67
Testing/Non-GM bu 1.42 1.38 1.65
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 9.36 3.66 3.66
Certainty Equivalent (Premium) 2.42 2.67 2.81
Total/All bu 7.57 6.35 6.68
Total/Non-GM bu 15.83 8.69 9.15
Location Percentage of Non-GM flow
Adoption Rate 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Farmer in Bin 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Country Elevator Received 77.7% 77.7% 77.7%
Country Elevator Loaded 50.6% 77.7% 77.7%
Export Elevator Received 51.6% 78.2% 78.2%
Export Elevator Loaded 48.9% 74.3% 74.3%
Importer Received 48.0% 73.2% 73.2%
Testing cost for all bushels increased for both cases while the probability of rejection at
the importer decreased from 2.83% in the base case to 1.78% for re-elevation and re-
elevation/diverted GM cases.  Quality loss decreased in both cases when compared to the base
case for all bushels suggesting a tradeoff between testing cost and quality loss.  GM in importer
flows is negligible.  Disutility increased as discounts escalated; hence, the risk premium also
increased to account for additional risks to the handler/shipper for re-elevation and/or diverted
GM grain charges.  Total cost for Non-GM bushels decreased for both re-elevation and re-
elevation/diverted GM cases reflecting a disproportionate decrease in quality loss versus
increases in testing costs and risk premium.  Compounding this effect are markedly higher Non-
GM deliveries at the importer of 73.2% versus 48% in the base case.  Figure 9 presents Non-GM
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Figure 9.  Effects of Re-elevation and Re-elevation/GM Diversion Costs on Costs/Non-GM
and Percent of Flows at Importer
Sensitivities on Strategic Variables
Sensitivities on strategic variables are performed to determine changes in optimal testing
strategies, risks, and costs when importers and handlers/shippers alter their strategic decisions.
Strategic variables that are performed include import tolerance specifications and variety
declaration contract mechanisms elicited by the handler/shipper.   
Import Tolerance Specifications
In the base case, importers specified an upper tolerance limit of 1% GM lot
concentration. Depending upon regulatory mandates, labeling requirements, end-user quality
specifications, and commercial firm preferences, the tolerance designated at the importer may be
tighter or looser.  To illustrate, import tolerances were loosened and tightened to quantify
additional system costs arising from each respective optimal strategy.  To simulate the impact,
five cases are developed with importer tolerances of 0.5%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5%.  The range is
inclusive of current industry practices; EU has set a level of 0.9% of all food and feed containing
GM; other countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong, etc., require a 5% tolerance,
while numerous countries mandate tolerances between 0.5% and 5% (Smyth and Phillips).  The
results are presented in Table 13.  45
Table 13.  Sensitivities to Importer Tolerance Specification
          Tolerance 0.5%
Base Case 
1% 2% 3% 4% 5%




Country Elevator Receiving 1-1-1% 1-2-4% 0-NA-NA0-NA-NA0-NA-NA0-NA-NA
Country Elevator Loading 1-5-5% 1-1-0.5% 1-1-1% 1-1-2% 1-2-0.5% 1-2-1%
Export Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA0-NA-NA0-NA-NA0-NA-NA0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5% 1-1-0.5% 1-1-2% 1-1-2% 1-1-4% 1-1-1%
Probabilities







1.93% 2.83% 4.35% 3.84% 6.07% 5.43%
Costs (c/bu)
Testing/All bu 1.03 0.68 0.34 0.34 0.21 0.21
Quality Loss/All bu 9.64 4.47 2.64 1.17 1.47 0.94
Testing/Non-GM bu 1.41 1.42 1.18 1.17 1.12 1.11
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 13.26 9.36 9.12 4.05 7.75 4.94
Certainty Equivalent   
(Premium)
7.66 2.42 0.84 0.43 0.31 0.22
Total/All bu 18.33 7.57 3.83 1.95 1.99 1.37
Total/Non-GM bu 25.19 15.83 13.20 6.71 10.51 7.17
Location Percentage of
Non-GM flow
Adoption Rate 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Farmer in Bin 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Country Elevator Received 77.7% 77.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Country Elevator Loaded 77.8% 50.6% 31.4% 31.4% 31.4% 31.4%
Export Elevator Received 78.2% 51.6% 32.8% 32.8% 32.8% 32.8%
Export Elevator Loaded 74.2% 48.9% 29.7% 29.7% 19.5% 19.5%
Importer Received 73.0% 48.0% 29.1% 29.3% 19.1% 19.2%
The optimal testing strategy becomes progressively less intensive as import tolerances
are loosened from 0.5% to 5%.  Testing is similar to the base case for a 0.5% import tolerance
with the exception of test tolerances.  Testing is conducted on every unit at country elevator
receiving at a 1% tolerance, every 5
th unit at country elevator loading at a 5% tolerance, and
every unit at export elevator loading at a 0.5% tolerance.  In contrast, the optimal testing
strategies for import tolerances tighter than the base case preclude testing at country elevator
receiving.  The lack of test application at country elevator receiving exacerbates adventitious
presence of GM within the Non-GM flow, primarily through adventitious commingling of high
GM lot concentrations with Non-GM lots (see Table 4).  The percentage of Non-GM flows at the




































0.50% Base, 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Figure 10.  Distribution of Quality Loss
base case, the probability of rejection at the importer decreases for the 0.5% case, and increases
for the 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% case.  GM in importer flows is negligible in all cases.
Disutility from additional system costs significantly decreases as tolerances are loosened.
Hence, the risk premium required to compensate handlers/shippers is 7.66 c/bu for a 0.5% import
tolerance, but progressively declines to 2.42 c/bu, 0.84 c/bu, 0.43 c/bu, 0.31 c/bu, and 0.22 c/bu
for a 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% import tolerance specification, respectively.  
Relative to the base case, Non-GM testing costs increase for the 0.5% import tolerance
case, and decrease for 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% import tolerance cases illustrative of reduced non-
conformance risk as tolerances are loosened.  Quality loss for Non-GM bushels decreases
41.67% from the 0.5% import tolerance case to the base case, 2.63% from the base case to 2%
import tolerance case, and 125% from the 2% import tolerance case to the 3% import tolerance
case. Quality loss increases 91.36% from the 3% import tolerance case to the 4% import
tolerance, and then decreases 56.88% from the 4% import tolerance case to the 5% import
tolerance case.  Increased quality loss at the 4% import tolerance can be attributed to the optimal
testing strategy, which utilizes discrete choice and utility theory.  Thus, the increased quality loss
likely reflects a discrete change in the choice set of strategies; whereas, if choices were
continuous, a strategy would likely be available part way between discrete choices where quality








































































Testing Cost Quality Loss Risk Premium Importer Flows
Figure 11.  Effects of Importer Tolerances on Costs and Importer Flows for Non-GM
Bushels
Total costs decrease as tolerance is loosened except at a 4% import tolerance, where cost
slightly increases due to a different strategy being employed that trades off a decrease in testing
cost for an increase in quality loss.  Figure 11 graphically depicts additional system costs for
Non-GM bushels and the percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer.
Variety Declaration
The base case scenario excludes mechanisms to elicit information from growers
regarding the GM content of their grains.  A system of contracts whereby growers sign affidavits
to declare varieties as either Non-GM or GM would facilitate segregation at the point of first
receipt.  To examine the system’s effectiveness, three models utilizing alternative distributions
were developed with variety declaration that assumes minimum, most likely, and maximum
values for farmer variety declaration at the point of origination.  The alternatives have triangular
distributions of:  (40%, 50%, and 60%), (65%, 75%, and 85%) and (80%, 95%, and 100%). 
Results for these scenarios with variety declaration are presented in Table 14.   48
Table 14.  Sensitivities to Variety Declaration
Variety Declaration  Base Case  40-50-60% 65-75-85%80-95-100%
            Utility 1.0145 1.0144 1.0141 1.0139
Optimal Strategy
Test (1=yes, 0=no)-Intensity-Tolerance
Country Elevator Receiving 1-2-4% 1-2-3% 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Country Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5% 1-2-5% 1-2-1% 1-5-3%
Export Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5% 1-1-4% 1-1-4% 1-1-1%
Probabilities
GM in Importer Flows (Buyer Risk) 0.000154% 0.000120%0.000139% 0.000092%
Rejection at Importer (Seller Risk) 2.83% 2.53% 2.60% 2.15%
Costs (c/bu)
Testing/All bu 0.68 0.67 0.47 0.51
Quality Loss/All bu 4.47 3.75 3.92 3.06
Testing/Non-GM bu 1.42 1.24 0.88 0.82
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 9.36 7.01 7.50 4.97
Certainty Equivalent (Premium) 2.42 2.34 2.26 2.19
Total/All bu 7.57 6.75 6.64 5.77
Total/Non-GM bu 15.83 12.59 12.70 9.33
Location Percentage of Non-GM flow
Adoption Rate 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Farmer in Bin 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Country Elevator Received 77.7% 77.7% 85.0% 81.7%
Country Elevator Loaded 50.6% 62.7% 63.4% 72.1%
Export Elevator Received 51.6% 63.4% 64.2% 72.7%
Export Elevator Loaded 48.9% 54.9% 53.7% 63.6%
Importer Received 48.0% 54.0% 52.8% 62.6%
With variety declaration, the optimal testing strategy becomes progressively less
intensive as the rate of farmer variety declaration increases.  This is due to less uncertainty
surrounding variety identification and segregation.  The low variety declaration model tested
every other unit at country elevator receiving and loading at a 3% and 5% tolerance,
respectively, and every unit at export elevator loading at a 4% tolerance.  Conversely, the
moderate variety declaration model avoided testing at country elevator receiving, but tested
every other unit at country elevator loading at a 1% tolerance and every unit at export elevator
loading at a 4% tolerance.  Similarly, the high variety declaration model relaxed testing to every
5
th unit at country elevator loading at a 3% tolerance and every unit at export elevator loading at
a 1% tolerance.
The rejection at the importer decreased for all variety declaration cases relative to the
base case.  GM in importer flows is negligible.  The percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer
increases for variety models reflecting less diversion at the country elevator.  Total costs for
Non-GM bushels decreases from 15.83 c/bu in the base case to 12.59 c/bu for the low variety





















































































Testing Cost Quality Loss Risk Premium Rejection at Importer
Figure 12.  Effects of Variety Declaration on Costs/Non-GM and Importer Rejection
decreases to 9.33 c/bu for the high variety declaration model.  However, when measured across
all bushels, cost is inversely proportional to the level of variety declaration.  The risk premium
similarly decreases with higher levels of variety declaration due to a continued decrease in
disutility.  Since current grain margins have evolved to approximately 2.5 c/bu, the development
of a contract mechanism for variety declaration is essential.  Additional system costs for Non-
GM bushels and the probability of rejection at the importer are shown in Figure 12. 
Sensitivities on Parametric Variables
Parametric variables include risk aversion 0 and GM adoption rate. 
Risk Aversion (0)
The risk parameter 0 will inevitably vary amongst handlers/shippers depending upon
their aversion to risk.  Correspondingly, sensitivities are conducted for the base case with more
and less risk aversion to illustrate the tradeoff between testing cost and quality loss.  Two cases,
0=0.9 (more risk averse) and 0=0.4 (less risk averse) are developed, and the optimal testing
strategy, risks, and costs are contrasted with the base case (0=0.5).  The results are presented in
Table 15.50
Table 15.  Sensitivities to Risk Aversion (0)
           Risk Aversion 0.4 Base Case, 0.5 0.9
              Utility 1.0112 1.0145 1.0281
Optimal Strategy
Test (1=yes, 0=no)-Intensity-Tolerance
Country Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 1-2-4% 1-1-0.5%
Country Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5% 1-1-0.5% 1-5-5%
Export Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Loading 1-1-0.75% 1-1-0.5% 1-1-0.75%
Probabilities
GM in Importer Flows (Buyer Risk) 0.000367% 0.000154% 0.000137%
Rejection at Importer (Seller Risk) 4.55% 2.83% 1.76%
Costs (c/bu)
Testing/All bu 0.34 0.68 1.03
Quality Loss/All bu 10.57 4.47 2.39
Testing/Non-GM bu 1.18 1.42 1.41
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 36.50 9.36 3.29
Certainty Equivalent (Premium) 1.63 2.42 3.28
Total/All bu 12.54 7.57 6.70
Total/Non-GM bu 43.30 15.83 9.19
Location Percentage of Non-GM flow
Adoption Rate 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Farmer in Bin 80.0% 80.0% 80.0%
Country Elevator Received 100.0% 77.7% 77.7%
Country Elevator Loaded 31.4% 50.6% 77.7%
Export Elevator Received 32.8% 51.6% 78.2%
Export Elevator Loaded 29.7% 48.9% 74.2%
Importer Received 29.0% 48.0% 73.2%
The optimal testing strategies intensify from the less risk averse case to the more risk
averse case indicating a preference shift for testing cost versus quality loss and rejection at the
importer.  Testing for the less risk averse case is conducted on every unit at country and export
elevator loading locations at a 0.5% and .75% tolerance, respectively.  The more risk averse case
tests every unit at country elevator receiving at a 0.5% tolerance, every 5
th unit at country
elevator loading at a 5% tolerance, and every unit at export elevator loading at a 0.75%
tolerance.  
The rejection rate at the importer is the highest for the less averse case, 4.55% versus
2.83% in the base case and 1.76% in the more risk averse case.  In addition, the percentage of
Non-GM flows is the lowest for the less risk averse case, 29% in contrast to 48% for the base
case and 73.2% for the more risk averse case.  The large diversion of Non-GM flows occur
primarily at country elevator loading for the less risk averse case since testing is not conducted at






















































































Rejection at Importer Additional Costs Total Costs (Additional + Risk Premium)
Figure 13.  Effect of Risk Aversion Parameter 0 on Importer Rejection and Additional
and Total Costs per Non-GM Bushel
Disutility for each of the cases increased as the risk parameter 0 was increased indicating
an increased propensity to avoid quality loss uncertainty.  With 0=0.9 the risk premium is 3.28
c/bu, but declines to 1.63 c/bu when 0=0.4.  More risk averse handlers/shippers discount
additional testing cost and quality loss more than less averse shippers and, consequently, require
a higher premium to participate in a dual marketing system.  
Total system costs decrease across Non-GM/all bushels as risk aversion increases.
Testing cost for Non-GM/all bushels increases while quality loss decreases from the less risk
averse case to the more risk averse.  The less risk averse handler/shipper is willing to incur high
quality loss with uncertainty to avoid testing cost with certainty; conversely, the more risk averse
handler/shipper prefers to test more intensively and reduce quality loss.  The preference of the
handler/shipper largely determines the optimal testing strategy and resulting tradeoffs between
testing cost and quality loss; thus, risk aversion (0) is a critical parameter in the analysis.  Figure
13 illustrates the proponents of additional system costs for Non-GM bushels and the probability
of rejection at the importer.52
GM Adoption
In the base case, a 20% GM adoption rate is assumed approximating that of GM corn.
However, the level of GM adoption by farmers is uncertain and depends upon factors such as
import restrictions, agronomic benefits, existence of a viable testing and segregation strategy,
variety declaration, etc.  To illustrate, prospective cases are developed for no variety declaration
and variety declaration (85-95-100%) that increase or decrease the level of GM adoption.  For no
variety declaration, the low adoption case assumes 10% GM adoption, while the high adoption
case assumes 25% GM adoption.  A 30% GM adoption case was simulated, but prohibitive costs
indicated that if GM adoption rates evolve to greater than 25%, variety declaration becomes
essential.  For variety declaration, four cases including 25%, 50%, 60%, and 70% GM adoption
are examined.  Additionally, a 75% GM adoption case was simulated, but prohibitive costs
indicated that if GM adoption is greater than 70%, an alternative system of testing and
segregation must be adopted.  The results for the no variety declaration cases are in Table 16.
Table 16.  Sensitivities of No Variety Declaration to GM Adoption
                GM Adoption 10% Base Case, 20% 25%
           Utility 1.0140 1.0145 1.0150
Optimal Strategy
Test (1=yes, 0=no)-Intensity-Tolerance
Country Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 1-2-4% 1-2-4%
Country Elevator Loading 1-1-5% 1-1-0.5% 1-1-0.5%
Export Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Loading 1-1-1% 1-1-0.5% 1-1-0.5%
Probabilities
GM in Importer Flows (Buyer Risk) 0.000119% 0.000154% 0.000215%
Rejection at Importer (Seller Risk) 2.34% 2.83% 3.48%
Costs (c/bu)
Testing/All bu 0.56 0.68 0.61
Quality Loss/All bu 3.37 4.47 6.28
Testing/Non-GM bu 0.98 1.42 1.56
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 5.86 9.36 16.12
Certainty Equivalent (Premium) 2.23 2.42 2.60
Total/All bu 6.16 7.57 9.49
Total/Non-GM bu 10.71 15.83 24.36
Location Percentage of Non-GM flow
Adoption Rate 90.0% 80.0% 75.0%
Farmer in Bin 90.0% 80.0% 75.0%
Country Elevator Received 100.0% 77.7% 72.9%
Country Elevator Loaded 60.9% 50.6% 41.5%
Export Elevator Received 61.7% 51.6% 42.7%
Export Elevator Loaded 58.7% 48.9% 29.9%

















































































Testing Cost Quality Loss Risk Premium Rejection at Importer
Figure 14.  Effects of GM Adoption on Non-GM Costs and Importer Rejection with
No Variety Declaration
The low adoption case averts testing at country elevator receiving and tests at a looser
tolerance at country and export elevator loading compared to the base case.  Alternately, the high
adoption case tests the same as the base case at country elevator receiving and loading and
export elevator loading.  At 30% GM adoption with no variety declaration, the defined system of
testing and segregation becomes cost prohibitive irrespective of the testing strategy.
The probability of rejection at the importer is directly proportional to the level of GM
adoption; thus, rejection risk is 2.34% for the low adoption case, 2.83% for the base case, and
3.48% for the high adoption case.  GM in importer flows is negligible.  
Total costs attributed to Non-GM bushels decreases to 10.71 c/bu for the low adoption
case, 15.83 c/bu for the base case, and increases to 24.36 c/bu for the high adoption case
compared to the base case.  Testing cost increases from 0.98 c/bu in the low adoption case to
1.42 c/bu in the base case, and 1.56 c/bu in the high adoption case.  Similarly, quality loss
escalates from 5.86 c/bu in the low adoption case to 16.12 c/bu in the high adoption case.  The
increase in both testing cost and quality loss stems from additional GM in the system
commingling adventitiously with a larger proportion of Non-GM flows.
Firms segregating both Non-GM/GM flows experience increased GM adventitious
commingling risk from higher adoption without variety declaration.  Consequently, disutility
increases from the low adoption case to the high adoption case necessitating a larger required
risk premium for handlers/shippers.
The percentage of flows at the importer decreased as adoption rates increased reflecting
lower initial percentages of Non-GM.  In the low adoption case, 57.8% flows were delivered to
the importer as Non-GM versus 48% for the base case, and 39.1% for the high adoption case. 
Figure 14 illustrates costs for Non-GM bushels and the probability of rejection at the importer.   54
The results for GM adoption in the variety declaration cases are presented in Table 17. 
Table 17.  Sensitivities of Variety Declaration to GM Adoption
        GM Adoption Base Case, 20% 25% 50% 60% 70%




Country Elevator Receiving 1-2-4% 0-NA-NA 1-1-1% 1-1-2% 1-1-3%
Country Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5% 1-2-5% 1-5-5% 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Receiving 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA 0-NA-NA
Export Elevator Loading 1-1-0.5% 1-1-2% 1-1-0.75% 1-1-0.75% 1-1-0.75%
Probabilities
GM in Importer Flows
(Buyer Risk)
0.000154% 0.000144% 0.00022% 0.000384%0.000286%
Rejection at Importer
(Seller Risk)
2.83% 2.30% 2.97% 3.69% 4.87%
Costs (c/bu)
Testing/All bu 0.68 0.51 0.61 0.49 0.38
Quality Loss/All bu 4.47 3.32 4.75 7.12 12.03
Testing/Non-GM bu 1.42 0.86 1.34 1.35 1.40
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 9.36 5.73 10.47 19.67 44.71
Certainty Equivalent
(Premium)
2.42 2.20 2.38 2.66 3.14
Total/All bu 7.57 6.03 7.73 10.26 15.55
Total/Non-GM bu 15.83 10.37 17.06 28.36 57.79
Location Percentage of
Non-GM flow
Adoption Rate 80.0% 75.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0%
Farmer in Bin 80.0% 75.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0%
Country Elevator Received 77.7% 77.1% 48.6% 38.9% 29.1%
Country Elevator Loaded 50.6% 66.3% 48.6% 38.9% 29.1%
Export Elevator Received 51.6% 67.0% 49.6% 40.1% 30.6%
Export Elevator Loaded 48.9% 59.9% 46.3% 37.0% 27.6%
Importer Received 48.0% 58.9% 47.2% 36.2% 27.0%
The optimal testing strategies became less intensive for GM adoption rates higher than
the base case.  The 25% case precluded testing at country elevator receiving and tested at the
country and export elevator.  The base case and 50% case performed testing at country elevator
receiving and loading and export elevator loading, while the 60% and 70% cases tested at














































































Testing Cost Quality Loss Risk Premium Rejection at Importer
Figure 15.  Effects of GM Adoption on Costs and Importer Flows for Non-GM Bushels
with Variety Declaration
Relative to the base case of 2.83%, rejection at the importer decreased to 2.30% for the
25% case, and progressively increased to 2.97%, 3.69%, and 4.87% for the 50%, 60%, and 70%
cases, respectively.  GM in importer flows is negligible.  
Total cost for Non-GM bushels decreased for the 25% case due to a decrease in testing
costs, quality loss, and risk premium, and an increase in percentage of Non-GM flows at the
importer relative to the base case.  Conversely, total cost increased for the 50%, 60%, and 70%
cases relative to the base case.  The increase in total cost originated from an increase in quality
loss and risk premium and a decrease in the percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer.  Total
cost surges at progressively higher GM adoption rates and eventually becomes cost prohibitive at
75% GM adoption, suggesting an upper bound to the defined system of testing and segregation. 
Figure 15 shows total cost for Non-GM bushels and probability of rejection at the importer.
Domestic System
The base case examines the impacts on optimal testing strategies, risks, and costs of a
dual marketing system with delivery to importers.  Alternatively, if the end-user is domestically
located, it entails less handling, transportation, and subsequent adventitious commingling risk. 
Models with no variety declaration and variety declaration using Risk Triangle 80-95-100% are
developed to examine the effects of delivery to a domestic market. 
The optimal strategy determines test application, intensity, and tolerance for country
elevator receiving and country elevator loading using a strip test.  Domestic user receiving
requires testing on every unit using a PCR test.  The penalty for non-conformance at the
domestic end-user is 2-20 c/bu, reflecting discounts and or re-routing of grain.  Other parameters
are as previously defined for the base case.  The results are presented in Table 18. 56
Table 18.  Domestic System
  No Variety Declaration Variety Declaration
               Utility 1.0120 1.0079
Optimal Strategy
Test (1=yes, 0=no)-Intensity-Tolerance
Country Elevator Receiving 1-4-0.75% 0-NA-NA
Country Elevator Loading 1-5-0.75% 1-4-0.5%
Export Elevator Receiving NA NA
Export Elevator Loading NA NA
Probabilities
GM in Importer Flows (Buyer Risk) NA NA
Rejection at Importer (Seller Risk) NA NA
GM in Domestic User Flow
(Buyer Risk)
0.0127% 0.0895%




Testing/All bu 0.36 0.16
Quality Loss/All bu 3.33 0.90
Testing/Non-GM bu 0.72 0.23
Quality Loss/Non-GM bu 6.70 1.26
Certainty Equivalent (Premium) 1.79 0.75
Total/All bu 5.48 1.81
Total/Non-GM bu 11.02 2.54
Location Percentage of Non-GM flow
Adoption Rate 80.0% 80.0%
Farmer in Bin 80.0% 80.0%
Country Elevator Received  77.7% 81.7%
Country Elevator Loaded  50.6% 72.2%
Export Elevator Received NA NA
Export Elevator Loaded NA NA
Importer Received NA NA
Domestic User Received 49.8% 71.3%
The domestic case under no variety declaration tested less intensively than the base case,
testing every 4
th unit at country elevator receiving at a 0.75% tolerance and every 5
th unit at
country elevator loading at a 0.75% tolerance.  The variety declaration case tested even less
intensively than the no variety declaration case, testing every 4
th unit at country elevator loading
at a 0.5% tolerance.  The probability of rejection at the domestic user increased to 3.59% for the
no variety declaration case, but decreased to 1.98% for the variety declaration case.  Additional
system costs across Non-GM bushels decreased 4.81 c/bu and 13.29 c/bu relative to the base
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Figure 16.  Effects of a Domestic versus Import System on Costs/Non-GM and Rejection
at End-User
The increase in the probability of rejection at the domestic user under no variety
declaration is attributable to adventitious commingling at country elevator loading and the
inability of the system to divert all GM flows from the Non-GM flow prior to domestic user
inspection.  Conversely, the decreases in additional system cost results from lesser penalties for
non-conformance and reduced adventitious commingling from handling and shipping.  The
percent of Non-GM flows for the 49.8% no variety declaration case and 71.3% for the variety
declaration case.  GM in domestic flows after rejection is negligible for both cases.
Total costs substantially decrease across all and Non-GM bushels in the domestic case,
reflecting lower testing costs, quality losses, and required risk premium.  Testing cost across
Non-GM bushels decreased from 1.42 c/bu in the base case to 0.72 c/bu and 0.23 c/bu for the no
variety and variety declaration cases, respectively.  In addition, quality loss across Non-GM
bushels decreased from 9.36 c/bu in the base case to 6.70 c/bu for the no variety declaration case
and 1.26 c/bu for the variety declaration case.  Furthermore, disutility decreased equating a risk
premium of 1.79 c/bu and 0.75 c/bu for no variety and variety declaration cases, respectively.  
The results indicate that additional system costs are less for both cases, although the probability
of rejection is higher for the no variety declaration case due to lower penalties for non-
conformance.  The incentive for establishing contract mechanisms is illustrated via an 8.48 c/bu
differential between the no variety and variety declaration cases.  Figure 16 illustrates the
probability of rejection at the importer and total costs across Non-GM bushels. 58
CONCLUSIONS
Segregation of like varieties with particular attributes exists to avoid commingling and
value-added losses.  The introduction of transgenic varieties has necessitated additional testing
and segregation to avert contamination at production, loading, unloading, storage, and
transportation phases of grain movement.  Segregation costs included in the research were
testing costs and risk premiums required to compensate handlers/shippers for risk of non-
conformance at the end-user.  Infrastructure modifications, storage utilization, and additional
costs of segregation are not considered.  
Importers and domestic end-users designate tolerance limits of genetically modified
grain. These are governed through regulatory guidelines and commercial firm preferences. 
Typically, non-conforming grain shipments incur a discount or are rejected when tolerance
exceeds end-user specifications.  Quality loss was included in the research to assess both the
extrinsic and intrinsic value of Non-GM lots containing adventitious presence of GM at the end-
user.  
The objective of this research was to evaluate the optimal testing strategy encompassing
test application, intensity, and tolerance for a dual marketing system consisting of Non-GM and
GM flows.  A stochastic optimization model was constructed utilizing an objective function that
maximizes portfolio utility (minimizes portfolio disutility) of additional system costs for a grain
marketing channel handling two states of nature (Non-GM and GM).  The model determined the
optimal testing application, intensity, and tolerance to employ at country elevator receiving,
country elevator loading, export elevator receiving, and export elevator loading subject to a
specified tolerance at the end-user.  Tests can be applied at any point in the marketing channel
with varying discrete intensities and tolerances (.04% to 5%).  PCR tests were required on every
lot at the end-user, while strip tests were applied based on testing strategy at country and export
elevators concurrent with industry practices.  The percentage of Non-GM and GM flows was
tracked throughout the system and used in calculating portfolio disutility. 
Summary of Results
The optimal testing strategy simultaneously determined test application, intensity, and
tolerance that minimized disutility of additional system costs for a portfolio of segregations.  The
model identified system costs through total costs across all bushels and Non-GM bushels. 
Various sensitivities were performed to determine how stochastic, strategic, parametric, and
other variables affected optimal testing strategies, risks, and costs.  Stochastic sensitivities
included risk of adventitious commingling at first delivery, penalty differentials, and re-
elevation/diverted GM discounts.  Strategic sensitivities included import tolerance specifications
and variety declaration.  Parametric sensitivities included risk aversion and GM adoption.  A
final sensitivity evaluated the effect of a domestic versus import system.  
Stochastic Sensitivities
The main benefit to performing sensitivities on stochastic variables was to assess changes
in optimal testing strategies, risks, and costs from random probability distributions.  Sensitivities59
of stochastic variables are examined in succeeding sections and variations are compared with
base case results.  
• Adventitious Commingling at First Delivery.  Costs and risks increased as the rate of
adventitious commingling at first delivery deviated from the base case due to the inability
to distinguish GM from Non-GM content.  Increased risk of adventitious commingling at
first delivery increased total costs through increases in testing cost, quality loss, and risk
premium.  Probability of rejection at importer also increased, while the percentage of
Non-GM flows decreased.  Similarly, lower risk of adventitious commingling at first
delivery increased total costs, albeit decreases in testing and risk premium components. 
The lower risk case exhibited increases in quality loss and thus total cost due to no
testing at country elevator receiving.  Correspondingly, the probability of rejection at the
importer increased and importer Non-GM flows decreased.  
• Penalty Differentials (Discounts).  Penalties varied from 0-10 c/bu for the low penalty
case to 100-150 c/bu for the high penalty case at the importer.  Total cost for all bushels
trended upwards as penalties were increased.  The most pronounced effect occurred in
the risk premium, which increased from 0.33 cu/bu for the low penalty case to 4.18 c/bu
in the high penalty case, reflecting a higher cost/risk for non-conforming lots.  Testing
cost and quality loss exhibited similar increases.  However, when costs were attributed to
Non-GM bushels, total cost declined for the high penalty case compared to the base case. 
The percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer were 29% for the low penalty case,
48% for the base case, and 73.2% for the high penalty case.  The probability of rejection
at the importer decreased as penalties increased, providing evidence of the tradeoff
between testing cost and seller risk.  
• Re-elevation and Re-elevation/Diverted GM Discounts.  Re-elevation and re-
elevation/diverted GM discount cases were incorporated to reflect re-elevation costs at
country and export elevator loading and discounts for diverting GM lots at country
elevator loading and export elevator receiving and loading.  For the re-elevation case,
total cost decreased due to increased testing at country elevator receiving.  The re-
elevation/diverted GM discount case tested more intensively than the re-elevation case
increasing total costs relative to the re-elevation case, but decreasing total cost compared
to the base case. Both cases decreased the probability of rejection at the importer from
2.83% in the base case to 1.78% and increased Non-GM flows at the importer to 73.2%. 
Handlers/shippers required progressively larger risk premiums as re-elevation and re-
elevation/diverted GM discounts were added, providing evidence that re-elevation and
marketability of grain are critical factors.  
Strategic Sensitivities
Strategic decisions by importers and commercial firms have implications for optimal
testing strategies, risks, and costs in a system.  The following sections examine sensitivities on
strategic variables, and variations are compared with base case results. 
• Import Tolerance Specifications.  Importers designate tolerances based on government
mandates and their preferences.  Firms may specify tighter tolerances then necessary60
based on consumer preferences and value-added market potential for differentiating
products.  Importer tolerances of 0.5%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% were examined relative to
the base case tolerance of 1%.  In general, total costs decreased as tolerances were
loosened with the exception of the 4% tolerance, which slightly increased due to a
different testing strategy.  Testing costs increased for the 0.5% case and then decreased
for tolerances looser than the base case.  Quality loss decreased as tolerances were
loosened with the exception of the 4% tolerance, which slightly increased.  As expected,
the risk premium required for handlers/shippers significantly decreased with a looser
tolerance specification.  This reveals that loosely specified tolerances for GM could be
attained with little additional risk imparted to the handler/shipper.  Ironically, the
percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer decreased as tolerance was loosened.  This
was mainly due to large diversions at country elevator loading from variety risk since
testing was not conducted at country elevator receiving for 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% cases. 
The probability of rejection at the importer generally decreased when tolerance was
tightened and increased when tolerance was loosened; however, it decreased from the 2%
case to the 3% case and again from the 4% case to the 5% case.  This is due to similar
testing strategies for 2% and 3% tolerances and 4% and 5% tolerances and the
corresponding decrease in tolerance within each range.
• Variety Declaration.  Contract mechanisms were adopted to elicit information from
farmers regarding the GM content of their grains.  The level of farmer variety declaration
assumed a Risk Triangle distribution representing minimum, most likely, and maximum
values.  Three models were developed including a 40-50-60%, 65-75-85%, and 80-95-
100% case to indicate the probability that farmers will tell the truth.  Higher levels of
variety declaration decreased total costs across all bushels.  Total cost across Non-GM
bushels also decreased except for the moderate case where they slightly increased due to
the percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer.  The total cost spread between the base
case and the high variety declaration case was 6.5 c/bu across Non-GM bushels.  It can
be viewed as the value to implementing contract mechanisms for variety declaration. 
Testing cost and quality loss generally declined for higher levels of variety declaration
indicating that less intensive testing strategies sufficiently reduced adventitious presence
of GM.  The risk premium also slightly declined from 2.42 c/bu in the base case to 2.34
c/bu, 2.26 c/bu, and 2.19 c/bu for the low, moderate, and high variety declaration case,
respectively.  At the importer, Non-GM flows generally increased for higher levels of
variety declaration, and the probability of rejection generally decreased although the
moderate case experienced a slight increase and decrease in probability of rejection and
Non-GM flows, respectively.  
Parametric Sensitivities
Sensitivities on parametric variables assess impacts to optimal testing strategies, risks,
and costs from system changes including risk aversion of handlers/shippers and the rate of GM
adoption.  The successive sections examine these changes and compare variations with the base
case.
• Risk Aversion (0).  The risk parameter 0 was varied from 0.5 in the base case to 0.4 and
0.9 to represent less risk averse and more risk averse handlers/shippers, respectively.  The61
optimal testing strategy intensified as risk aversion increased indicating that more risk
averse firms prefer testing to quality loss.  Correspondingly, testing costs progressively
increased and quality loss steadily decreased for higher levels of 0.  The risk premium
required to compensate handlers/shippers decreased from 2.42 c/bu in the base case to
1.63 c/bu for the less risk averse case and increased to 3.28 c/bu for the more risk averse
case.  The probability of rejection at the importer increased for the less risk averse case
and decreased for the more risk averse case.  Total costs across all bushels and Non-GM
bushels declined for higher levels of 0.  Across Non-GM bushels, the less risk averse
case had a total cost of 43.3 c/bu compared to 15.83 c/bu the base case and 9.19 c/bu for
the more risk averse case.  The large disparities resulted from quality loss and were
further exacerbated by the percentage of Non-GM flows at the importer, which
significantly increased for higher levels of risk aversion.  
• GM Adoption.  Varying levels of GM adoption could proliferate in the case of GM
wheat depending upon import restrictions, agronomic benefits, and consumer
preferences.  GM adoption rates were varied for no variety declaration and variety
declaration scenarios to identify system implications. 
Three cases including 10%, 25%, and 30% GM adoption were examined with no variety
declaration; however, only 10% and 25% cases provided feasible results.  The 10% case
employed a less intensive testing strategy that resulted in lower testing costs, quality loss,
and total costs across all and Non-GM bushels.  In addition, the percentage of Non-GM
flows increased from 48% in the base case to 57.8%.  The 25% case tested the same as
the base case and resulted in higher testing cost, quality loss, and total cost when
measured across Non-GM bushels, partially due to 39.1% of flows being Non-GM at the
importer.  The risk premium and probability of rejection at the importer both increased
for higher GM adoption rates, indicating that it becomes more challenging to remove
adventitious presence of GM in a no variety declaration.  The 30% case was unable to
achieve segregation of Non-GM and GM flows at a cost less than the underlying value of
the commodity.  This reveals that GM adoption rates greater than 25% necessitate a
system of variety declaration with contract mechanisms.   
The rate of GM adoption with variety declaration was varied to 25%, 50%, 60%, 70%,
and 75% to simulate impacts on the system.  The 75% case was infeasible indicating that
a GM adoption rate greater than 70% would necessitate an alternate system of testing and
segregation and/or IP to adequately maintain segregation of GM and Non-GM flows.  As
the rate of GM adoption increased, testing was less intensive and quality loss generally
increased with the exception of the 25% case where quality loss decreased.  Total costs
across all and Non-GM bushels generally increased as the GM adoption rate increased
except for the 25% case where total cost declined.  The risk premium initially decreased
for the 25% and 50% cases, and then increased for the 60% and 70% cases because
disutility was lower for 25% and 50%, and higher for 60% and 70% compared to the base
case.  The probability of rejection at the importer initially decreased for the 25% case and
then progressively increased for 50%, 60%, and 70% cases. Conversely, the percent of
Non-GM flows at the importer increased for the 25% case and then progressively
decreased for 50%, 60%, and 70% cases.  The rationale for lower importer rejection, risk62
premium, and total costs for the 25% case and lower risk premium for the 50% case may
be attributed to discrete choice and utility theory.
Implications
Development and commercialization of genetically modified crops continues to challenge
the current functions and operations of the grain marketing system.  With the anticipated
commercialization of GM wheat, these issues remain increasingly important.  The research
defines several relationships between optimal testing strategies, risks, costs, and different
variables impacting the dual marketing system.  The impact of stochastic, strategic, parametric,
and other variables on the optimal testing strategies, risks, and costs are shown and evaluated.
Implications for public and private sectors are summarized in the following sections.
There are several implications for the public sector.  First, a system of testing and
segregation can efficiently provide end-users differentiated grain shipments to meet consumer
requirements at a low cost.  While nil tolerances are unattainable, GM content can reasonably be
assured for current import specifications of 0.5% or above.  Second, grain uniformity and quality
deviations existing in the marketplace are minimized due to quality loss applied at the end-user. 
Sellers view deviations from zero percent GM contamination as an implicit cost; thus, more
rigorous testing ensues thereby reducing GM content in Non-GM shipments.  Third, consumer
differentiation among value-added products necessitates a system of testing and segregation to
properly allocate Non-GM and GM flows.
Several private sector implications exist.  First, a system of testing and segregation
drastically reduces cost when compared to an IP alternative.  IP entails increased monitoring and
documentation through production, storage, transportation, and handling phases.  Second, with
rapid advancements in testing technology, costs and risks will progressively decrease.  Third,
risk premiums evolve to compensate grain handlers for added risks of a dual marketing system
versus a Non-GM system.  Fourth, adventitious presence resulting from variety risks will
encourage grain handlers to adopt a system of contract mechanisms.  Fifth, additional penalties
(AO) encourage handlers/shippers to test more intensively to avoid quality losses.  Sixth, import
tolerance defines testing strategy and accompanying costs and risks.  Seventh, more and less risk
averse grain handlers tradeoff definite testing costs for indefinite quality loss.  Eighth, the rate of
GM adoption has a significant bearing of the viability of the defined system of testing and
segregation.  With no variety declaration, GM adoption of greater than 25% necessitates variety
declaration mechanisms.  With variety declaration, GM adoption of greater than 70% provides
cost prohibitive results and thus necessitates an alternate form of testing and segregation and/or
IP.  Ninth, delivery to a domestic user requires a system of variety declaration.63
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